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The United States Constitution affects the ability of federal, state
and local governments to combat criminal activity. Since the relevant
constitutional provisions are in the form of broadly stated legal
commands,' the constitutionality of specific law enforcement practices
can only be determined when the courts, ultimately the Supreme Court
of the United States, interpret these commands in cases in which they
are challenged.
As has long been recognized, the judicial role in the interpretation
process is a creative one, for when conflicting policies compete for ac-
ceptance, a court's interpretation will further one policy at the expense
of another.' The court's policy preference can only be rational and respon-
sible when it is based on "considerations of what is expedient for the
community concerned."'3 This requires the court to know the communi-
ty, determine how implementation of each competing policy would af-
fect it, and choose the policy of greatest utility for that community.'
Cases involving electronic surveillance' by law enforcement agen-
* Copyright 1982, Benjamin M. Shieber.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. The author thanks Mr. John F. Reid,
a member of the Louisiana, Texas, California and New York bars, for research
assistance in 1973-1974 when he was a student at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center.
1. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966) (White, J., dissenting); Adam-
son v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90-91 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 325 (1945) (Black, J.); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934) (Hughes, C.J.); G. HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN COR-
PORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 78 (1918); 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 31-32
(Howe ed. 1963).
3. 0. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 32.
4. See B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 120 (1927); F. COHEN, ETHICAL
SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 43-45 (1933); Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence, 74 COLUM.
L. REv. 1023,1028-32 (1974); Karst, Legislative Facts in ConstitutionalLitigation, 1960 Sup.
CT. REV. 75, 78-81.
5. This article adopts the definition of electronic surveillance used by the National
Wiretap Commission. The term
generally includes wiretapping and bugging .... Wiretapping generally refers to the
interception (and recording) of a communication transmitted over a wire from a
telephone, without the consent of any of the participants. Bugging generally refers
to the interpretation (and recording) of a communication transmitted orally, without
the consent of any of the participants. The term consensual surveillance refers to the
overhearing, and usually the recording, of a wire or oral communication with the con-
sent of one of the parties to the conversation.
National Wiretap Comm. Report, p. xiii, note (1976).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
cies involve two competing policies. They are the societal interests in
(1) protecting individual freedom from governmental intrusions on
privacy by means of electronic surveillance, and (2) protecting individual
freedom from private, criminal invasions of privacy. Statements identi-
fying the conflicting interests as "individual privacy" and "law enforce-
ment"' are misleading because they imply that law enforcement is an
end in itself and that it necessarily limits individual freedom. Both of
these implications are invalid.
Law enforcement is not an end in itself. It is only a means to the
end of protecting individual freedom from private, criminal invasions.
And, rather than limiting individual freedom, law enforcement is indis-
pensable to it by protecting individuals from criminal acts by private
persons.' Thus, it is erroneous to believe that individual freedom is
enhanced whenever law enforcement powers are limited.
There is, in particular, no warrant for assuming that eliminating
governmental electronic surveillance will expand individual freedom. On
the contrary, its elimination may contract individual freedom by sub-
jecting people to the power of authoritarian criminal regimes that are
not subject to any political controls.
Unfortunately, such regimes exist in the United States. The most
powerful one is sometimes called "Organized Crime," sometimes the
"Mafia," sometimes "La Cosa Nostra." Innumerable killings, beatings
and coerced silences testify that the private nature of this regime does
not prevent it from interfering with the individual freedom of persons
in the United States.
6. See, e.g. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); E. LONG, THE INTRUDERS
27 (1967); King, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance: A Neglected Constitutional Con-
sideration, 66 DICKINSON L. REV. 17, 30 (1961); REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED
CRIME OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS
148 (Washington D.C. 1976); Comment, Sneaking Through the Castle Gate: Covert Entries
by Police to Plant Bugging Devices, 67 GEo. L.J. 1429, 1436 (1979).
7. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 539, 542 (1966) (White, J., dissenting); M.
COHEN, REASON AND LAW 5(1950, M. FLEMING, OF CRIMES AND RIGHTS 84-87 (1978); R. HALE,
FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER 3 (1952); J. LOCKE.
TREATISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT, quoted in B. CARDOZO. THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE
94-95 (1927). In cases involving racial discrimination, it is now well recognized that ac-
tions of private persons can deprive others of civil rights. See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88 (1971). P. Kurland, The Private I: Some Reflections on Privacy and the Constitu..
tion, Center for Policy Study, University of Chicago (1976), reprinted in, G. McDOWELL,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY, at 283 (1981).
8. See text following note 46 through text accompanying note 56, infra. In 1980,
the Chairman of the Pennsylvania Crime Commission reported, "Daily, Pennsylvanians
are damaged or destroyed financially, brutalized, maimed, burned or murdered with such
frequency that in some communities these terrors are considered an acceptable way of
life." PENNSYLVANIA CRIME COMMISSION, A DECADE OF ORGANIZED CRIME- 1980 REPORT vi
(1980).
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In order to determine whether governmental electronic surveillance
increases or lessens individual freedom, it is not enough to examine the
extent to which it invades privacy.' One must also examine existing and
potential invasions of individual freedom by organized crime, and how
useful electronic surveillance is in combatting organized crime. One will
then be equipped to decide whether or not governmental electronic
surveillance is necessary to enable law enforcement to combat more ef-
fectively organized crime's invasions of individual freedom. This article
examines these factors and concludes that judicially supervised law en-
forcement electronic surveillance expands individual freedom and is
constitutional.
II. STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS OF ORGANIZED CRIME
Organized crime is composed of twenty-five gangs with bases of
operation in many states, including, New York, New Jersey, Illinois,
Florida, Louisiana, Nevada, Michigan and Rhode Island."0 These gangs
9. The flaw in some articles on the constitutionality of various law enforcement
techniques is that they limit themselves to examining only this question. See, e.g., Com-
ment, Telescopic Surveillance as a Violation of the Fourth Amendment, 63 IOWA L. REv.
708 (1978). They give little or no consideration to how much a particular law enforcement
technique contributes to effective law enforcement and thereby to the protection of indi-
vidual freedom from criminal invasions. E.g., McNulty, Dalia v. United States: The Validity
of Covert Entry, 65. IOWA L. REV. 931, 958-62 (1980); Comment, Tracking Katz: Beepers,
Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE L.J. 1461 (1977). By omitting or slighting con-
sideration of the extent to which a law enforcement technique contributes to protecting.
individual freedom for criminal invations, the authors' conclusions reflect only their per-
sonal preferences on how much is too much invasion of personal privacy, rather than a
meaningful accommodation of the needs of members of our society for both privacy from
governmental intrusions and security from private criminal invasions.
10. See the testimony of James W. Nelson, an F.B.I. expert on organized crime, in
Organized Crime and Use of Violence, Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomrn. on Investiga-
tions of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs 96th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1 at 88 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as 1980 Senate Hearings]. In 1967, there were twenty-four gangs. See
TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, 7 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT). An
excellent, concise description of the structure of the Cosa Nostra is given in TENTATIVE
DRAFT, ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 27-31 (June 1968). A brief
description of La Cosa Nostra, which is refered to as "an organized crime conspiracy which
is controlled nationally by a membership which is exclusively Italian" is contained in
paragraphs 3 and 4 of an affidavit of F.B.I. Special Agent E. Michael Kahoe dated December
5, 1977 in United States v. Licavoli, 456 F. Supp. 960 (N.D. Ohio 1978). In 1976, the Task
Force on Organized Crime of the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Stan-
dards and Goals opined that "organized crime problems exist in every State and
metropolitan area of the Nation. . ." in its TASK FORCE REPORT at 2 [hereinafter cited as
1976 TASK FORCE REPORT]. In 1980, a federal indictment charged Frank Tieri to be "the boss
of the largest crime family in La Cosa Nostra in the United States" receiving "tribute"
from extortion, gambling, narcotics and murder. See N.Y. Times, July 1, 1980, S B, at 1,
col. 3. Tieri was convicted on November 21, 1980. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1980, at 25, col.
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consist of about 2,000 full members, all of whom are of Italian descent.
Twenty thousand associates," who are of varied ethnic backgrounds, are
employed by or otherwise affiliated with these gangs.2
The operations of the gangs are coordinated by a central adminis-
trative body, called the "Commission," whose members are the leaders
of several of the most powerful gangs.'3 This commission has nationwide
authority and acts to prevent or resolve disputes between different gangs
and sometimes, e.g., when the leadership of a gang is in dispute, within
a gang."
The gangs engage in illegal activities to make money and to avoid
detection, conviction and punishment of gang members and associates.
The most lucrative activities are those which provide illegal materials
and services to willing customers. Thus, organized crime gangs gross
billions of dollars annually from gambling operations. The Justice Depart-
ment estimated that the 1973 annual gross volume of illegal gambling
was $29 to $39 billion with more than 40 percent under Mafia control."8
6. Earlier in 1980, a New Jersey jury convicted four men of conspiracy to participate in
a "secret nationwide criminal organization", La Cosa Nostra or Mafia. Seventy-nine criminal
acts were allegedly engaged in by the conspirators. See N.Y. Times, June 21, 1980, at 25,
col. 5.
11. See testimony of F.B.I. agent James W. Nelson, 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note
10, at 90-91. Earlier it was believed that La Cosa Nostra had about 5,000 members. See
1967 TASK FORCEREPORT, supra note 10, at 6-7; N. GAGE, THE MAFIA Is NOT AN EQUAL OP-
PORTUNITY EMPLOYER 36 (1971). Nelson testified, "Without a doubt, in our estimation, the
group known as La Cosa Nostra is the most powerful organized crime group in this coun-
try. It is first in an organized criminal ranking, that has no second or third. No one else
is close." Nelson, 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 87.
12. See 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 7. For an excellent overview of
organized crime based in part on access to thousands of pages of F.B.I. electronic
surveillance logs of organized crime members, see G. BLAKEY & R. BILLINGS, THE PLOT TO
KILL THE PRESIDENT 179-259 (1981).
13. See 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 8; REPORT OF THE HOUSE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 164-65 (1979); C. MOLENHOFF, STRIKE
FORCE: ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE GOVERNMENT 24 (1972). For a report on the 1964 conver-
sation, between Samuel Rizzo De Cavalcante and Joseph Zicarelli, about the Commission,
see N.Y. Times, June 11, 1969, at 34, cols. 5-6. Excerpts from De Cavalcante's conversa-
tions are reprinted in J. KWITNY, VICIOUS CIRCLES - THEMAFIA IN THE MARKETPLACE, 58-61
(1979). According to one report, the Commission met in 1976 in the New York City area
and authorized each of the five New York gangs to admit up to ten new members. N.Y.
Times, March 21, 1976, at 1, col. 2. Another report states that a 1980 Philadelphia meeting
of representatives of seven of the nine gangs on the Commission gave the Chicago gang
control over Las Vegas activities. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1981, S A at 11, col. 1; 0. DEMARIS,
THE LAST MAFIOSO 69 (1981).
14. See G. BLAKEY & R. BILLINGS, supra note 12, at 233-34; D. CRESSEY, THEFT OF THE
NATION 111, 154-55 (1969); V. TERESA, MY LIFE IN THE MAFIA 82 (1973).
15. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS
RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 143 & note (1976) [hereinafter
cited as NWC REPORT]. The estimated degree of Mafia control varied. It was: Northeast,
53.2 percent; Midwest 47.4 percent; Southeast, 35.7 percent; Far West 29.2 percent; and
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The validity of these multi-billion dollar revenue estimates is evidenced
by information about the income of gambling operations whose operators
are apprehended. One Mafia numbers game in New Jersey run by five
persons from a private dwelling in 1969 was reported to have had a daily
income of $50,000."' Authorities believe that 1980 organized crime con-
trolled gambling in Connecticut is an $800 million a year operation." In
1975, one report estimated that the largest numbers game in New York
City had an annual income of hundreds of millions of dollars.'8 Loan shark-
ing is the second largest source of revenue for Mafia gangs. Probably,
annual income from this activity is also in the multibillion dollar range."
Other revenue producing illegal activities reported include narcotics,"
fixing sports events,' pornography,' securities thefts, 3 hijacking,"
cigarette bootlegging," extortion, labor racketeering," and arson. 8
Southwest 2 percent. See 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 3; see generally, HEAR-
INGS BEFORE THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS
RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (1976) [hereinafter cited as NWC
HEARINGS].
16. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1970, at 16, col. 6.
17. See id., April 21, 1980, S B, at 2, col. 1.
18. See id., May 8, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
19. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1971); 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 10, at 3. According to one report, a New York City Water Supply Commis-
sioner, paid 104 percent interest a year to a Mafia gang member. See M. DORMAN, PAYOFF
80 (1972). Gary Bowdach, an organized crime associated loan shark, testified that he "put
[his] money on the street at weekly interest rates of up to 10 percent." Organized Criminal
Activities, Hearings before the Permanent S ubcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs. 95th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 15-17 (1978).
20. See, e.g., 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10. at 3-4; N.Y. Times, July 17,1968,
at 88, col. 1; id., June 11, 1966, at 12. col. 3.
21. See ORGANIZED CRIMINAL INFLUENCE IN HORSERACING, H.R. REP. No. 93-326, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. passim (1973). N.Y. Times, June 29, 1973, at 57, col. 3.
22. See N.Y. Times, April 21, 1972, at 20, col. 6; id., March 5, 1978, at 33, col. 1.
23. See M. DORMAN, supra note 19, at 282-90; H. ABADINSKY, THE MAFIA IN AMERICA
79-81 (1981); H. NELLI, THE BUSINESS OF CRIME 262 (1976); San Francisco Chronicle, June
9, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
24. See V. TERESA, supra note 14, at 137-40; Surface, Easier than Robbing a Bank, N.Y.
Times, May 7, 1967, 6 (Magazine) at 127, 132.
25. See Cook, Cigarette Bootlegging: Who Says "Crime Doesn't Pay?", Forbes, Dec.
15, 1977, at 43-48.
26. See United States v. Rastelli, 551 F.2d 903 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 831 (1977).
F. PASLEY, AL CAPONE, THE BIOGRAPHY OF A SELF-MADE MAN 192,248 (1931); E. REID, MAFIA
98-99 (1964); N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1967, at 63, col. 4; id., June 25, 1978, at 26, col. 6; id.
June 3, 1977, at 1, col. 4.
27. See 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 5; Labor Management Racketeer-
ing, Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, 20, 40-66, 79, 87, 94-97, 105 (1978); M. DOn-
MAN, supra note 19, at 296-300; J. KWITNY, supra note 13, at 150-58. For an excellent account
of early organized crime involvement in labor racketeering and its profitability, see H.
NELLI, THE BUSINESS OF CRIME, 242-51 (1976).
28. See Arson-For-Hire, Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations
of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 36-62 (1978).
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Organized crime gangsters also derive revenue from legal activities
in a wide range of businesses.' In 1951, the Kefauver Committee reported
that organized criminals were active particularly in the "sale and distribu-
tion of liquor, real estate operations, night clubs, hotels, automobile agen-
cies, restaurants, taverns, cigarette vending companies, juke box con-
cerns, laundries, the manufacture of clothing, and the transmission of
racing and sports news... ."so The legal business activities of many of
the gangsters who met at Appalachin, New York, in 1957 were believed
to be in these areas." In addition, organized crime figures were reported
to have substantial interests in the private trash disposal business."2
Gang members often use legal activities as a springboard for illegal
revenue producing activities. For example, control of a legitimate
business has been used to sell fraudulent stock, to commit arson for in-
surance, to defraud suppliers and milk assets before placing an enter-
prise in bankruptcy, and to sell contaminated meat to customers.,
Revenue producing activities of this magnitude require substantial
administrative support. Besides the normal administrative activities that
any large enterprise would engage in, the gangs rely on illegal methods.
The principal illegal administrative activities in support of both the il-
legal and legal revenue producing activities are murder and intimida-
tion of actual and potential witnesses, corruption of law enforcement and
other public officials, and murder and intimidation of competitors, sup-
pliers and customers.
Murder and intimidation of witnesses and potential witnesses against
organized crime figures is a frequent occurrence. Gang members and
other criminals suspected of providing information to law enforcement
officials have been killed,, some while under police protection."M Many
29. See 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 4; Labor Management Racketeering
Hearing, supra note 27, at 178-81.
30. S. REP. No. 307, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 170-81 (1951). See also Baton Rouge Morning
Advocate, Nov. 30, 1978, S E. at 5, col. 1; N.Y. Times, April 17, 1978, S A, at 1, col. 1; id.,
Oct. 8, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
31. 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 4.
32. N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1967, at 89, col. 2.
33. 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10 at 4; N. GAGE, supra note 11, at 175-76; J.
KWITNY, supra note 13, at 14-5, 32-33, 103-22; Houston Post, June 6, 1975, S A, at 17, col. 1.
Resort hotels associated with organized crime sometimes serve as a base for illegal gam-
bling, prostitution, and other criminal activities. See N.Y. Times, April 17, 1978, S A, at
1, col. 1.
34. See the testimony of Joseph Valachi in Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Nar-
cotics, Hearings Before Permanent Subcomm. of Investigations of Senate Government Opera-
tions Comm. 88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 351-56 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Nar-
cotics Hearings]; J. STARR, THE PURVEYOR 139, 189-90 (1961); F. TANNENBAUM, CRIME AND
THE COMMUNITY 110-15 (1938).
35. See D. FRASCA, KING OF CRIME 126-27 (1959); 1963 Narcotics Hearings, supra note
1328 [Vol. 42
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law abiding witnesses have also been murdered or intimidated.,
Corruption of law enforcement and other government officials is also
a long standing organized crime procedure. Corruption benefits orga-
nized crime by securing lax law enforcement by the corrupted public
officials and information on the activities of uncorrupted law enforce-
ment personnel.' "In different places at different times, organized crime
has corrupted police officials, prosecutors, legislators, judges, regulatory
agency officials, mayors, councilmen, and other public officials ... " con-
cluded the 1967 Task Force Report on Organized Crime." The Task Force
reported that some local governments were dominated by organized
crime, and that in many large cities "there [was] a considerable degree
of corruption.""0 The available evidence shows that organized crime con-
tinues to use the technique of corruption on the local, state, and national
levels."
In 1963 one observer wrote, "When organized crime embarks on a
venture in legitimate business it ordinarily brings to that venture all
the techniques of violence and intimidation which are employed in its
illegal enterprises. "" This, too, has not changed. According to one report,
in one city a waste product was sold by every seller to a business con-
trolled by organized crime, even though the buyer paid only one-third
of the price that other buyers were willing to pay.'" Another report in-
dicates that when, in 1965, a national supermarket chain refused to buy
a detergent sold by a company in which the then acting boss of one gang
had an interest, some of its stores were dynamited, two of its employees
34, at pt. 1, at 118, 378-80; J. STARR, supra note 34, at 185-86 & note; N.Y. Times, July 19,
1977, at 14, col. 6.
36. F. PASLEY, supra note 26, at 176; F. TANNENBAUM, supra note 34,105-08; Johnson,
Organized Crime: Challenge to the American Legal System, 53 J. CRIM. L. C. & P.S. 399,408
n-55, 417 (1962); N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1977, at 29. col. 3; id., March 31, 1972, at 1, col. 5;
id., Feb. 2, 1975, at 39. col. 1; id., Oct. 18, 1972, at 1, col. 2; Houston Post, July 16, 1973,
S A. at 7, col. 1.
37. 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 93.
38. See N.Y. Times, July 4, 1980, S A, at 9, col. 1; Baton Rouge Morning Advocate,
Nov. 24, 1978, S C. at 9, col. 1; Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Nov. 25, 1978, S B, at 11,
col. 1.
39. See J. GARDINER, WINCANTON: THE POLITICS OF CORRUPTION, 1967 TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 10, at app. B.
40. 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 6.
41. M. DORMAN, supra note 19, passim; G. BLAKEY & R. BILLINGS, supra note 12, at
253-54. See N.Y. Times, June 10, 1978, at 23, col. 1; id., Dec. 31, 1977, at 8, col. 1; id., Oct.
21, 1977, S A, at 27, col. 1; id., Aug. 6, 1968, at 42, col. 1; id., Dec. 18, 1968, at 43, col. 1;
id., Dec. 19, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
42. Johnson, supra note 36, at 402-04.
43. See 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT. supra note 10, at 5; J. KWITNY, supra note 13, at
109-10; N.Y. Times, July 24, 1980, S B. at 2, col. 6; id., Aug. 2, 1980, at 25, col. 6. See also
N. GAGE, supra note 11, at 180-82.
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were murdered and others were beaten." Organized crime also uses cor-
ruption in its legitimate business ventures. Thus, meat companies con-
trolled by organized crime personnel were reported to have sold diseased
meat, unfit for human consumption, to the public with the connivance
of corrupted federal inspectors." Murder, corruption, and intimidation
provide a substantial advantage over business competitors; and orga-
nized crime uses them to secure that advantage."'
III. RESTRICTIONS ON INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM BY ORGANIZED CRIME
Organized crime deprives many persons within the United States
of their rights to life, liberty and property. It does this by means of
murder, extortion, intimidation, and corruption.
Extortion involves violence or threats of violence to a person or those
he cares about unless he gives a gang member some economic benefit.
A person who is required to pay a share of his earnings to a gang member
is deprived of both property and liberty to engage in his chosen occupa-
tion for his own benefit."? Similarly, a person is deprived of property and
liberty when he is forced by violence, or threats of violence or labor
troubles, to purchase an unwanted product or service.'8 Organized crime
gangs have used murder and intimidation to deprive union members of
freedom to choose their union officers and citizens of freedom to choose
their public officials."1
Murder and intimidation also have been used to silence actual and
potential witnesses against organized crime figures. These crimes
deprive persons of their lives as well as their freedom to cooperate with
governmental agencies. Examples of such incidents are numerous. In
44. See J. DEMMA & T. RENNER, THE MAFIA IN THE SUPERMARKET. reprinted in N. GAGE,
MAFIA, USA 329-30 (1972).
45. J. KWITNY, supra note 13. at 23-46; 1975 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY
GENERAL 94.
46. See T. C. SCHELLING, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ORGANIZED CRIME, 1967 TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 10, at 116.
47. See C. MOLLENHOFF, supra note 13, at 47, 134; S. PENN, Muscling In, reprinted in
N. GAGE, MAFIA, USA, 336-37 (1972); A. SEEDMAN & P. HELLMAN, CHIEF 412-16,182-85 (Avon.
ed. 1972); A. TULLY, TREASURY AGENT (1958), reprinted in G. TYLER, ORGANIZED CRIME IN
AMERICA 207 (1962).
48. See United States v. Compagna, 146 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1944); M. JOHNSON, CRIME
ON THE LABOR FRONT (1950), reprinted in G. TYLER, supra note 47, at 201, which discusses
extortion from motion picture exhibitors and producers. See also J. DEMMA & T. RENNER,
THE MAFIA IN THE SUPERMARKET, reprinted in N. GAGE, MAFIA, USA 329-30, 334 (1972).
49. See M. JOHNSON, supra note 48, reprinted in G. TYLER, supra note 47, at 201; A.
TULLY, supra note 47, reprinted in G. TYLER, supra note 47, at 207; C. MOLLENHOFF, supra
note 13, at 90-91; V. PETERSON, THE BARBARIANS IN OUR MIDST (1952), reprinted in G. TYLER,
supra note 47, at 156-57; F. PASLEY, supra note 26, at 176 (on Cicero election); KANSAS CITY
GRAND JURY REPORT (1961), reprinted in G. TYLER. supra note 47, at 297.
[Vol. 421330
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1926, two key witnesses against members and associates of the Al Capone
gang were killedN In 1930, a witness to the murder of a federal prohibi-
tion agent was murdered."1 In 1967, a twenty year old who testified about
the theft of $370,862 in securities by organized crime figures was found
dead from numerous stab wounds.2 During a 1972 New York investiga-
tion of organized crime, a key witness was called out of his restaurant
and shot to death.' There are many such incidents.'
Corruption of public officials potentially deprives persons of all
freedoms since these officials will not protect citizens against gang-
sanctioned criminal activity and will use public agencies to further gang
policies." The problem is a present one. Many local, state and federal
officials have been corrupted by organized crime. In some communities
the extent of corruption is total, in others it is extensive.0
This corruption is one reason that citizens are unwilling to report
organized crime activities to the public. As the Task Force on Organized
Crime said:
Anyone reporting corrupt activities may merely be telling his story
to the corrupted; in a recent "investigation" of widespread corrup-
tion, the prosecutor announced that any citizen coming forward with
evidence of payments to public officials to secure government ac-
tion would be prosecuted for participation in such unlawful conduct."1
The problem is serious enough to have resulted in a Task Force recom-
mendation that reports on organized crime conditions "should be
50. F. PASLEY, supra note 26, at 176.
51. F. TANNENBAUM, supra note 34, at 105-08 (1938) (quoting N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1932,
at 44).
52. N.Y. Times, April 6, 1967. at 25, col. 3; A. SEEDMAN & P. HELLMAN, supra note
47, at 342-43.
53. N.Y. Times, March 31, 1972, at 1. col. 5.
54. See numerous cases mentioned by Johnson, supra note 36, at 401, 408 n.55, 417.
Joseph Barboza informed on Raymond Patriarca and Henry Tamaleo, New England gang
bosses, in 1968. See, V. TERESA, supra note 14, at 240-54. He was murdered in San Francisco
in 1976. San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 5, 1976, S Cal., at 4, col. 1. Authorities believe that
at least six persons with information about a $5.8 million robbery from Lufthansa Airlines
in 1978 have been murdered to prevent them from disclosing the information. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 3, 1980, S A, at 1, col. 2.
55. C. MOLLENHOFF, supra note 13, at 79,143; F. TANNENBAUM, supra note 34, at 95-97;
NWC REPORT, supra note 5, at 74; V. TERESA, supra note 14, at 142-43, 145, 149; G. BLAKEY
& R. BILLINGS, supra note 12, at 253-54.
56. See 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 6; C. MOLLENHOFF, supra note 13,
at chs. 5, 9 & 12; M. DORMAN, supra note 19, at 7-71; N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1966, at 25, col.
5. One writer estimated that preventive corruption of police officers in 1970 cost the Cosa
Nostra gang in a city of 230,000 a monthly four figure payment, and that additional
payments were made to judicial officers. See A. ANDERSON, THE BUSINESS OF ORGANIZED
CRIME 57-58 (1979).
57. 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 6.
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withheld from jurisdictions where corruption is apparent and knowledge
by a corrupt official of the information in the report could compromise
enforcement efforts."'
The limitations on individual freedom which now result from orga-
nized crime's corruption of public officials are great. Corruption enables
organized crime to enlist governmental power more effectively to limit
persons' freedom to engage in economic activities for their own benefit. 9
and to cooperate with law enforcement. ' But the potential limitations
on individual liberty from a gangster-governmental partnership are even
greater. They are not limited to those that further the economic interests
of organized crime. Freedom of speech and of the press may be limited
in the interest of one or another partner. In February, 1946, longshore-
men of the union headed by Anthony Anastasia barred reporters from
the pier from which Charles (Lucky) Luciano was being deported to
Italy.' Other reported instances include the blinding of investigative
reporter Victor Riesel in 1956,2 and the murder of anti-facist editor Carlo
Tresca in 1943.3
Organized crime has demonstrated its willingness, for a price, to
serve governmental officials by improving the wartime efficiency of the
New York docks," and by assisting in plots to murder Fidel Castro in
Cuba on behest of the C.I.A." Clearly, organized crime poses a substan-
58. Id. In 1978, the F.B.I. charged that some law enforcement agencies disclosed in-
formation from a nationwide computer file on organized crime to organized crime gangs.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1978, at 65, col. 1.
59. C. MOLLENHOFF, supra note 13, at 15.16, 135-45, 179.
60. See 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 6,24; P. MAAS, infra note 66, at 172,
195; M. GOSCH & R. HAMMER, THE LAST TESTAMENT OF LUCKY LUCIANO 251-53 (1975); J.
LANDESCO, ORGANIZED CRIME IN CHICAGO 18 (1929); C. MOLLENHOFF, supra note 13, at 79. In
1979, it was charged that some United States Marshals in Newark, New Jersey, cooperated
with organized crime gangs. See Baton Rouge Sunday Advocate, Nov. 27, 1979, S A, at
4, col. 1.
61. See G. WOLFE & J. DIMONA, FRANK COSTELLO-PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNDER-
WORLD 165-66 (Bantam ed. 1975); M. GoscH & R. HAMMER, supra note 60, at 281-82 (1975); N.Y.
Herald Tribune, Feb. 10, 1946, at 24, col. 3.
62. John Dioguardi was indicted for the 1956 blinding of Victor Reisel. J. DEMMA &
T. RENNER, THE MAFIA IN TIlE SUPERMARKET, reprinted in N. GAGE, MAFIA, USA, at 332
(1972). See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1979, J B, at 6, col. 1; REPORT OF TIlE HOUSE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 162-63 (1979).
63. See E. REID, supra note 26, at 77-79,82-84; A. SEEDMAN & P. HELLMAN, supra note
47, at 49; N.Y. Times, July 13, 1979, S B. at 2, col. 1; R. SALERNO & J.TOMPKINS, THE CRIME
CONFEDERATION 287 (1969).
64. See F. SONDERN, JR., BROTHERHOOD OF EvIL (1959), reprinted in G. TYLER, s upra note
47, at 309-11; M. GOSCH & R. HAMMER, supra note 60. at 262-68. The account in the Gosch
& Hammer book was substantially confirmed by a 1954 New York state report made public
in 1977. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
65. ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOI.VING FOREIGN LEADERS, S. REP. No. 94-465,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 74-85 (1975). On July 19, 1975, several days before he was scheduled
to testify before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities on the alleged
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tial actual and potential threat to the individual liberties of persons in
our society.
IV. SAFEGUARDS PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AGAINST
INVASION BY ORGANIZED CRIME
Internal and external safeguards protect individual freedom from
more extensive invasion by organized crime. One internal safeguard is
that organized crime's resources are not sufficient for it to exercise con-
trol over wider areas of American society. Even organized crime's 2,000
members, 20,000 associates and 50 billion dollar gross revenue are in-
adequate to the task of exercising greater control over a population of
more than 200 million persons, many of whom are imbued with the spirit
of individual freedom and are willing to cooperate with law enforcement.
Another less important internal safeguard is the Mafia's desire to avoid
unfavorable publicity. Criminal activity that is likely to outrage public
opinion to the point of resulting in a crackdown on gang revenue pro-
ducing activities is usually avoided." But the fact that public interest
is soon diverted and public outrage short lived makes this a very weak
safeguard against organized crime activities."
The external safeguards on invasions of individual freedom by
organized crime gangs are more effective since they are independent
of organized crime's resources or desire for avoidance of bad publicity.
The only significant external safeguard is the possibility of apprehen-
sion and punishment by governmental authorities. 8 The penalties for
murder, assault, and extortion are severe, ranging up to life imprison-
ment and the death penalty. The possibility that these penalties will be
imposed has increased in recent years." High ranking gang leaders, in-
cluding national commission members, have been sentenced to long
prison terms."0
C.I.A. plot to kill Castro, Sam Giancana, former head of the Chicago gang, was murdered.
In July, 1976, John Roselli, one of Giancana's lieutenants who testified before the Senate
Committee in 1975, was also murdered. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1976, 16, col. 4. See also
G. BLAKEY & R. BILLINGS, supra note 12, at 385-91.
66. Compare the reported refusal to kill then New York District Attorney Thomas
E. Dewey, reported in P. MAAS, THE VALACHI PAPERS at 144 (1968), with the alleged murders
of James R. Hoffa on July 30, 1975, and Cook County, Illinois, Assistant State Attorney
William H. McSwiggin in 1926. See N.Y. Times, July 23, 1978, at 32, col. 1.; S. BRILL, THE
TEAMSTERS 61-71 (1978, J. LANDESCO, ORGANIZED CRIME IN CHICAGO, PART III OF THE ILLINOIS
CRIME SURVEY OF 1929, ch. 1 (U. of Chicago Press 1968). See also G. BLAKEY & R. BILLINGS,
supra note 12, at 106-08, xiv, 338, 364-66, 384-88.
67. See M. DORMAN, supra note 19, at 94-95.
68. The possibility of self-help by a victim is too remote to be a significant safeguard.
But see N.Y Times, Jan. 18, 1980, S B, at 2, col. 5.
69. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1979, S A, at 14, col. 3.
70. E.g.. Vito Genovese, discussed in Hearings Before the Senate Permanent Subcomm.
on Iwestigationh, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 250 (1964). Raymond Patriarca, discussed
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These facts protect individual liberty from invasion by organized
crime gangs in two ways. First, the removal of gang members from
society limits their ability and their associates' ability to commit crimes. 1
Second, the threat of punishment deters gang members and associates
from engaging in some criminal activities in which they might otherwise
engage.2 Clearly the possibility of apprehension and punishment for
criminal activity is an important safeguard protecting individual freedom
from more invasion by organized crime gangs.
V. WHAT ORGANIZED CRIME DOES TO OVERCOME
LAW ENFORCEMENT LIMITATIONS ON ITS ACTIVITIES
As stated above, the possibility of apprehension and punishment is
a significant external safeguard against organized crime's invasions of
individual freedom. Effective law enforcement-the ability of law en-
forcement agencies to detect criminal activity, apprehend its perpetra-
tors, and secure sufficient evidence to convict them -is required for the
possibility of punishment to exist. Of course, effective law enforcement
does not guarantee that a convicted criminal will actually be subject to
meaningful penalties. Judges may impose lenient or no penalties;78 politi-
cians may parole and pardon even after meaningful penalties have been
imposed.7' But since there can be no significant penalty without effec-
in V. TERESA, supra note 14, at 256; John Dioguardi, discussed in N.Y. Times, Jan. 16,1979,.
S B, at 6, col. 1; Anthony Provenzano, discussed in N.Y. Times, June 15, 1978, S A, at 1,
col. 5.; N.Y. Times, March 26, 1978, at 1, col. 6; Carmine Galante, discussed in N.Y. Times,
Oct. 12, 1977, at 22, col. 2. See Section VI, infra, at text accompanying notes 159-69.
71. Imprisonment does not prevent gang leaders from continuing to function as such.
Both Charles (Lucky) Luciano and Vito Genovese are believed to have led their gangs,
from prison. See M. GOSCH & R. HAMMER, supra note 60, at 265-66; P. MAAS, supra note 66,
at 261.
72. See J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (Ann Arbor, University of
Michigan Press, 1974).
73. See U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO CONGRESS, WAR ON ORGANIZED CRIME
FALTERING 26-27 (1977). For the lenient treatment of organized crime figures by New York
judges, see N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1972, at 1, col. 6; A. STEEDMAN & P. HELLMAN, supra note
47, at 195-96; Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 42 N.Y.S.2d 369.366 N.E. 2d 1299, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977). The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 empowers judges
to impose increased sentences on convicted organized crime gang members. See 18 U.S.C.
S 3575 (1976). See also United States v. Ilacqua, 562 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 906,917,947 (1978; N.Y. Times, July 29, 1980, S B, at 5, col. 1. The constitutionality
of 18 U.S.C. S 3576 which authorizes the United States to appeal from what it considers
an inadequate sentence under the dangerous special offender provisions, was upheld in
United States v. Di Francesco, 101 S. Ct. 426 (1980). Mr. Justice Blackmun noted "that S
3576 represents a considered legislative attempt to attack a specific problem in our criminal
justice system, that is, the tendency on the part of some trial judges 'to mete out light
sentences in cases involving organized crime management personnel.'" 101 S. Ct. at 440.
74. M. DORMAN, supra note 19, at 99, 134-35; V. TERESA, supra note 14, at 93-94; Jack
Anderson article in Parade Magazine, Aug. 10, 1980, at 5.
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tive law enforcement, it is vital to the external safeguard of possible
punishment.
Effective law enforcement is itself dependent on one essential-
information about the criminal activities of organized crime. Without such
information law enforcement agencies often cannot know even that a
crime was committed much less who the perpetrators were. Nor can they
apprehend the criminals or produce evidence to prove their guilt. Thus,
without information about the criminal activities of organized crime ef-
fective law enforcement to combat it is impossible.
Because organized crime recognizes the importance of denying in-
formation about its criminal activities to law enforcement agencies, its
structure and many of its operating procedures are designed for this
very purpose. Information about criminal activity must come from par-
ticipants, victims, witnesses, or real evidence. Organized crime uses
measures to deny law enforcement agencies information from each of
these sources. It limits information from participants principally by in-
sulation of gang leaders, discipline of gang members, and careful per-
sonnel selection practices.
Insulation is accomplished by use of an established chain of command
in the gang and by the employment of a "buffer" for gang leaders. The
chain of command is boss, under boss, lieutenants, and soldiers.75 Since
it is usually the "soldiers" or persons who are not gang members who
perform the criminal acts, and since they receive their orders through
the chain of command, the boss andother gang leaders are insulated from
responsibility for the crimes.
In addition to the chain of command, Mafia bosses also use a "buf-
fer" to help them avoid personal contact with members of the gang while
administering its criminal activities. John J. Shanley, of the New York
Police Department testified that "Rleaders of the syndicate] deal through
a buffer, a member .... The buffer's main duty is to stay between the
boss and trouble .... In these families [gangs], all important matters go
through channels. At the last stage, it comes to one man-the buffer-
and he takes it to the overlord.... ."76
One of Valachi's murders illustrates how insulation works to deny
law enforcement agencies information about the involvement of gang
75. See 1968 Narcotics Hearings, supra note 34, at pt. 1, at 80-82,87, and chart of Vito
Genovese gang facing 248; V. TERESA, supra note 14, at 87.
76. See 1963 Narcotics Hearings, supra note 34, at pt. 1, at 66-68. Apparently, some
gangs do not use insulation. According to one source, in the Rochester, New York, gang,
consisting of about forty-five persons, the boss and under-boss personally ordered the
murder of an unsatisfactory member. See the testimony of Angelo Monachino, one of the
murderers, in Arson-For-Hire, Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations
of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (1978).
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leaders in criminal activities. Valachi himself testified that in 1952,
Charles (Lucky) Luciano, who was in Italy, ordered the murder of Eugene
Gianini, a New York gang member who had become an informer. Valachi
volunteered for the job. Valachi's boss, Anthony (Tony Bender) Strollo,
told Valachi that he, Strollo, would have to secure approval from the
gang boss, Vito Genovese, and later told Valachi that Genovese approved.
Valachi assigned the task of killing Gianini to three aspirants for La Cosa
Nostra membership, Pat Pagano, Joe Pagano, and Fiore Siano. Accord-
ing to Valachi, these three killed Gianini.
Thus, in order to hold Genovese legally responsible for the murder
a highly improbable chain of informers would have to exist: one of the
three killers on Valachi, Valachi on Strollo, and Strollo on Genovese. It
did not exist. None of the participants was ever arrested for the murder.7
Discipline of members is another technique used by organized crime
to limit information to law enforcement agencies. This discipline is
achieved by means of penalties for divulging information and rewards
for loyal service. Its effectiveness is enhanced because of the common
ethnic and, in many cases, family relationship of gang members.
As we have seen, membership is limited to persons of Italian
descent.78 The bond of common ethnic background is further strengthened
by family relationships among gang members. Fathers and sons,
brothers, uncles and nephews, and in-laws are often members of the same
gang." An additional bond is sometimes provided by a ritual ceremony
of induction in which blood is drawn to symbolize "a blood relationship"
between the members and oaths are taken not to expose the organiza-
tion." When he joins, the initiate is told what he already knows-that
77. 1963 Narcotics Hearings, supra note 34, at pt. 1, at 351-56; M. GOSCH & R. HAM-
MER. supra noie 62, at 356. See also, the reversal of Anthony Biase's conviction for attemp-
ted murder of a witness against him on charges of possession and sale of narcotics. Ferina
v. United States, 302 F.2d 95, 104-05 (8th Cir.). cert. denied, sub nom. Cardarella v. United
States, 371 U.S. 819 (1962).
78. See 1963 Narcotic Hearings, supra note 34, at pt. 1, at chart of Vito Genovese gang
facing 248, also at 156, 158, 238; V. TERESA, supra note 14, at 86-87; testimony of Angelo
Monachino, Arson-For-Hire, Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations
cf the Senate Comm. on Govermental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 55, 59-60 (1978); testimony
of Gary Bowdach, in Organized C-iminal Activities, Hearings Before the Permanent Sub-
comm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
15-16 (1978).
79. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, March 9, 1969, at 71, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1979, at
2, col. 4.
80. See 1963 Narcotics Hearings, supra note 34, at pt. 1, at 181-85 for Valachi's ac-
count of his induction and E. REID, MAFIA 157-58 (rev. ed. 1964) for Tony Notaro's account
of his 1918 initiation into the Comorra, a criminal organization that preceded in Mafia.
Jimmy Fratiano, a member, describes his own initiation ceremony and that of another;
and in a wire-tapped conversation three members discuss when they and Jerry Catena,
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death is the penalty for informing."
There are many instances of imposition of this penalty. Eugene
Gianini was killed for being an informer.' Ernest (The Hawk) Rupolo,
who had supplied information to police about Vito Genovese's participa-
tion in a 1934 murder was killed in 1964." From 1975 to 1977, several
members and associates of the Outfit, Chicago's organized crime gang,
were killed because it was thought that they had or might become
informers." During this period, twenty-three F.B.I. informants and
witnesses about organized crime activities were murdered, some while
in federal prisons." Valachi's fear that he would be killed for informing,
led him to murder a fellow inmate.u
To the stick of murder, organized crime joins the carrot of wealth
for disciplined service. Organized crime's 50 billion dollar annual gross
revenue means that rewards for members are very substantial.' The
gang also rewards loyalty by providing legal services and support for
a member's family if he is imprisoned. Organized crime also uses its
influence with some public officials to secure a light sentence, or a parole
or pardon for gang members and associates."
Careful personnel selection also reduces the possibility that gang
members will give law enforcement agencies information. Aspirants for
a Genovese gang leader, were "made" members. See 0. DEMARIS, THE LAST MAFIOSO 3-4,
325-26 (1981); G. BLAKEY & R. BILLINGS, supra note 12, at 235; V. TERESA, supra note 14, at 87.
81. See 1963 Narcotics Hearings, supra note 34, at pt. 1, at 185; R. MARTIN, REVOLT
IN THE MAFIA 56 (Popular Library ed. 1964); P. MAAS, supra note 66, at 96; A. SEEDMAN &
P. HELLMAN, supra note 47, at 407; V. TERESA, supra note 14, at 244.
82. See text accompanying note 81, supra.
83. See D. FRASCA, KING OF CRIME 129(1959). For a dramatic account of Rupolo's murder
and the trial and acquittal of John (Sonny) Franzeze and three others indicted for the
murder, see J. MILLS, THE PROSECUTOR 73-186 (Pocket Book ed. 1970).
84. See N.Y. Times, July 31, 1977, at 24, col. 3; id., Aug. 9, 1976, at 16. col. 4.
85. See Gage, Has The Mafia Penetrated the F.B.I.?. N.Y. Times Magazine, Oct. 2,1977,
at 15; Organized Criminal Activities, Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investiga-
tions of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 181 (1978). See
also N.Y, Times, March 26, 1978, at 26, col. 1; id., April 11, 1978, at 16, col. 3; id., July
31, 1977, at 26, col. 1; id., Dec. 4, 1976, at 10, col. 6.
86. See P. MAAS, supra note 66, at 26-31; P. Maas, eupra note 66, at 161.
87. See 1968 Narcotics Hearings, supra note 34, at pt. 1, 301. For insights into the
lifestyle of Lucky Luciano, Frank Costello, and other less notorious gangleaders, see G.
WOLFE & J. DIMONA. FRANK COSTELLO: PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNDERWORLD 60,91,95,100,
131 (Bantam ed. 1975); N.Y. Times, Nov. 1. 1977, at 40, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1977,
S B at 21, col. 2.88. See 1968 Narcotics Hearings, supra note 34, at pt. 1, at 239-40; V. TERESA, supra
note 14, at 295-97. Failure of some gang leaders to provide this help has resulted in some
associates becoming informers. See V. TERESA, supra note 14, at 7-12.
89. See United States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836
(1963); M. DORMAN, supra note 19, at 74-76,121-28, 214-26. See the report on Raymond Pat-
riarca's 1938 Massachusetts pardon in V. TERESA, supra note 14, at 93-94.
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gang memberships must prove themselves through participation in gang
controlled serious crimes." The three aspirants for gang memberships
whom Valachi recruited for the actual task of killing Eugene Gianini did
not expect or receive money. Valachi testified that participation in
murder was required for admission to the Vito Genovese gang, and that
is what the killers wanted and received."
The importance that organized crime ascribes to careful personnel
selection is evidenced by the report that one purpose of the 1957 Appa-
lachin La Cosa Nostra meeting was to expel "some couple of hundred
of new members ... that never done anything,"" and the report that.
Vito Genovese justified his murder of Albert Anastasia, another gang
leader, by charging that Anastasia had been selling memberships. 3
These are the means used by organized crime to insure that gang
members and associates will not provide information to law enforcement
agencies. It uses additional techniques to suppress information from vic-
tims of and witnesses to its activities. The principal techniques are
murder and intimidation. Others are professionalism, use of legitimate
businesses as covers, and national and international operations.
Conrad Greaves, a black man, worked his way from bartender to
owner of a lucrative night club in Queens, New York. His warmth and
personality were key factors in his success. An organized crime gang
tried to extort a share of the club's income from Greaves." Greaves
resisted until his maitre'd and some of his customers were beaten up.
Then he began to pay $400 a week out of his $20,000 gross receipts. After
six months, Greaves went to the authorities and testified before a grand
jury. His testimony resulted in the indictment of six persons for extor-
tion and felonious assault. He was "an indispensable witness," accord-
ing to an assistant district attorney.. On March 31, 1972, Greaves was
shot to death in the street near his night club by three to five men "who
calmly stood in the street firing at him as he tried to run for his life.""
After his death, the extortion charges were dropped."
90. See R. MARTIN, supra note 81, at 56-57; J. STARR. supra note 34, at 19-22.
91. See 1963 Narcotics Hearings, supra note 34, at pt. 1, at 356; P. MAAS, supra note
66, at 218, 241 & note. Teresa stated that murder is a prerequisite for membership in
the "Office," the name for New England organized crime. V. TERESA, supra note 14, at 87.
92. 1963 Narcotics Hearings, supra note 34, at pt. 1, at 338-89. See P. MAAS, supra
note 66, at 246.
93. See 1963 Narcotics Hearings, supra note 34, at pt. 1, at 348; P. MAAS, supra note
66, at 246.
94. The extortion technique consisted of one man posing as a "peacemaker" after
thugs beat up employees and customers. If the paid services of the "peacemaker" were
rejected, the beatings would continue. N.Y. Times, March 31, 1972, at 1, col. 5. Teresa
describes the same racket being used in Massachusetts in the early 1960's and states that
it yielded $1,000 per month from twenty night clubs. V. TERESA, supra note 14, at 116-17.
95. N.Y. Times, March 31. 1972. at 1,' col. 5.
96. Id., Nov. 22, 1972, at 75, col. 4.
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Conrad Greaves was one murdered witness in a line that includes
August Gobel, the boiler attendant, who witnessed the murder of a pro-
hibition agent in 1920, and, before he could testify, was killed while at
work under police guard." Another witness who suffered the same fate
was Patricia Parks, a model who was stabbed to death."' The cases of
murder of victims and witnesses are too numerous to list in an article."
Intimidation is an even more frequently used technique. The 1976
Report of the Task Force on Organized Crime of the National Advisory
Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, reports that in a
major northeast city "almost every witness connected with an organ-
ized crime prosecution in that city is subject to intimidation." 00 As ear-
ly as 1932, the United States Attorney in Chicago, George E. Q. Johnson,
informed the Senate that, in organized crime cases, witnesses called
before the grand jury preferred imprisonment to the certainty of
vengeance which would result if they gave testimony."'
That intimidation is effective is evident not only from the above cited
statements of law enforcement officers but also from numerous incidents
in which witnesses have refused to testify or recanted prior testimony
because of fear of physical violence to themselves or loved ones. For ex-
ample, in 1975 a university professor recanted his original grand jury
testimony that was instrumental in indicting Alphonse Indelicato, a
member of the Joseph G. Colombo, Sr., gang, for perjury. According to
an assistant district attorney, the professor was terrified to appear in
court." The best evidence of the effectiveness of intimidation is the fact
97. F. TANNENBAUM, supra note 34, at 105-08; N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1932, at 44, col. 2.
See also a column by Jack Anderson entitled Mob, Crooks and Medicaid, Chicago Style for
an account of the murder of a witness against Irwin Weiner, a reputed associate of Chicago
organized crime figures, in Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, April 8,1978, S A, at 18, col. 2.
98. N.Y. Times. Feb. 2, 1975, at 39, col. 7.
99. Johnson. supra note 36. at 399, 408 nn. 55 & 56, 409 n. 57. cites many incidents.
See also N.Y. Times, April 27, 1967, at 32, col. 8; id., April 6, 1967, at 25, col. 3; id., April
7. 1972, at 21, col. 2. A passerby who happened to witness a gangland murder in October,
1979 and testified against the killers was found shot to death in Brooklyn in his car in
May, 1980. See N.Y. Times, May 14, 1980, S B, at 3, col. 5.-
100. 1976 Task Force Report, supra note 10, at 10.
101. F. TANNEBAUM, supra note 34, at 110-15. See also the testimony of William J. Duffy,
Director of Intelligence, Chicago Police Department, in 1963 Narcotics Hearings, supra
note 34, at pt. 2, at 512-13; testimony of Walter E. Stone, Superintendent, Rhode Island
State Police, id. at pt. 2, at 552-53; testimony of Clarence M. Kelly, FBI Director, 1 NWC
HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 96.
102. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1975, at 43, col. 3. See also, id., June 3, 1977, at 1, col.
4.; id., Nov. 11, 1976, at 29, col. 1; id., Jan. 12, 1968, at 47, col. 7; R. MARTIN, supra note
81, at 31, 37.39, 61. In order to get witnesses to testify about a neighborhood killing, a
New York detective had to convince them that the slaying was not connected with organiz-
ed crime. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1977, S A, at 1, col. 6. Witnesses' refusal to testify in criminal
cases because of fear of reprisal is a growing problem nationally. See id., Nov. 14, 1977,
at 29, col. 3.
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that in many organized crime cases the United States can only secure
witnesses' testimony by providing them with new identities and new
lives."3
The professionalism with which organized crime gangs operate also
serves to deny information to law enforcement agencies. Thus, cars used
in crimes are registered under fictitious names and addresses.0 Such
cars are safer than stolen cars because in addition to the owner being
untraceable, the car user need not be concerned about being stopped
by the police for driving a stolen car.
The professionalism with which gangland murders are performed
was testified to by Valachi."' Raymond V. Martin, a former New York
police officer, described the professional techniques for commiting
murder with a gun in writing about the murder of Frank Abbatemarco,
which he investigated.
This was a professional job. Professional gunmen wear gloves. They
have a routine, too. They shoot for the head and the neck so that
if a victim lingers on, he will not be able to talk. The body is always
filled with bullets; there is certainty in numbers.'"
That this professionalism denies law enforcement agencies vital in-
formation is evident from the fact that only a miniscule number of
organized crime murders are solved. No one was ever'convicted for any
of the numerous murders that Valachi testified about.0 7 Between 19213
and 1929, not a single conviction followed the 257 reported organized
crime killings in the United States and 90 percent of the murders were
unsolved.0 8 The figures for organized crime murders committed since
then are not much better.'
103. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 Pub. L. No. 91-452 SS 501-504, 84 Stat.
933-34; N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1971, at 50, col. 3; L. WALLER, HIDE IN PLAIN SIGHT 175(1976).
As of 1977, 2,229 persons were under protection in the Federal Witness Protection Pro-
gram at a cost of $14 million a year. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1977, S B, at 1, col. 1. By 1979,
3,150 witnesses had entered the program. 1979 U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT
80.
104. See 1963 Narcotics Hearings, supra note 34, at pt. 2, at 513-14; N.Y. Times, April
1, 1972, at 27, col. 5.
105. See, e.g., 1963 Narcotics Hearings, supra note 34, at pt. 1, at 171-73, 356; see also
0. DEMARIS, THE LAST MAFIOSO 23-25, 51-55 (1981).
106. R. MARTIN, supra. note 81, at 11. See also V. TERESA, supra note 14, at 81-82.
107. ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS, S. REPORT No. 72,89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 14-16 (1965).
108. F. TANNENBAUM, supra note 34, at 115-16.
109. Of 976 organized crime murders in Chicago from 1919 to 1963, only two were
cleared by the arrest and conviction of the killers. See 1963 Narcotics Hearings, supra note
34, at pt. 2, at 487-88; 1976 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 10, giving law enforce-
ment officials' estimate that the odds against solving an underworld homicide in the North-
east "are about 600 to L"
1340 [Vol. 42
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
Further barriers to public awareness of organized crime activities
result from members' involvement in legitimate business operations. The
Kefauver Committee in its 1951 Third Interim Report found that orga-
nized crime members were active in the "sale and distribution of liquor,
real-estate operations, night clubs, hotels, automobile agencies,
restaurants, taverns, cigarette-vending companies, juke-box concerns,
laundries, the manufacture of clothing, and the transmission of racing
and sport news.. .. ""' Other businesses that have been infiltrated by
organized crime include trash collection and air freight."' In addition to
producing revenue, the legitimate business may serve to assist in and
as a cover for illegal activities. In the 1930's, bakeries and laundries
served as cover for the operation of illegal stills."' Trucking operations
at waterfronts and the import-export business are used in the smuggl-
ing of narcotics. "8 Acetic anhydride used in the treatment of rayon can
be procured from organized crime garment manufacturing plants and
put to another use, the conversion of raw opium to a morphine base for
heroin manufacture."' The ownership of garbage disposal facilities
enables gang members to dispose of evidence of criminal activities."' In
short, legitimate businesses provide a protective chain of supply, pro-
duction, and distribution for many organized crime enterprises. The
public and law enforcement agencies often see only legitimate business
activities which raise no suspicions.
The national and international scope of organized crime's activities
also contributes to its ability to deny information to law enforcement
agencies. One example of organized crime's national scope is found in
two reported cases: La Rocca v. United States, 337 F.2d 39 (8th Cir. 1964)
and Ferina v. United States, 302 F.2d 95 (8th Cir. 1962). These cases in-
volve illegal 1957 purchases of revolvers in Colorado, burglary of an Iowa
drug wholesaler, purchase of the stolen drugs in Nebraska, and the 1960
Kansas City, Missouri, attempted murder of a witness against Anthony
110. THIRD INTERIM REPORT OF THE SENATE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ORGAN-
IZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1951). For an
analysis of the legal and illegal activities of a 75 member organized crime gang in a city
of 230,000 in the 1960-1970 period see A. ANDERSON, THE BUSINESS OF ORGANIZED CRIME-A
COSA NOSTRA FAMILY 116-35 (1979).
111. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1967, at 89, col. 2; id., Oct. 4.1969, at 26, col. 1; id., May
30, 1979, S B, at 1, col. 5; id., May 5,1967, at 42, col. 5.
112. J. STARR, supra note 34, at 165-67.
113. See FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN
THE LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD, S. REP. No. 1139,86th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 498 (1960).
114. Id. at 498-99. See VAN NOSTRAND'S SCIENTIFIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, verbo morphine (5th
ed. 1976). For an account of diversion of sugar from legitimate businesses to illegal alcohol
production see J. STARR, supra note 34, at 176-77.
115. See P. MAAS, supra note 66, at 242. See also S. BILL, THE TEAMSTERS 56-57 (1978).
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Biase, the alleged drug seller, using one of the guns illegally purchased
in Colorado in 1957.116
Each of the related incidents took place in a different state. Together,
they are but one example of the interstate scope of the operations of
organized crime.
Other indications of the interstate scope of organized crime activities
are the control of Nevada and Puerto Rico gambling operations by New
York and Chicago gang members,"' the national disposition of hijacked
and other stolen goods,"' the national production and marketing of il-
licit alcohol,"' and the national distribution of bootleg cigarettes.'
The national scope of La Cosa Nostra operations is also exemplified
by the fact that murderers may be imported from other states in order
to enforce La Cosa Nostra rules or to further its revenue producing ac-
tivities. In 1963, Chicago Superintendent of Police 0. W. Wilson testified
that the 976 gangland-type slayings in the Chicago area since 1919 "were
usually committed by hired killers often imported from other cities for
this specific purpose, as in the case of the Kilpatrick slaying."'' The
Kilpatrick murder was committed in Chicago, Illinois, by two Detroit
based killers in 1961. John H. Kilpatrick was a union officer who had
incurred the enmity of a Chicago labor racketeer. Detroit Police Com-
missioner George C. Edwards, after stating the facts with respect to this
interstate murder, said:
The reason that I point this out, Senator, is because frequently we
believe the major criminal activities of this variety are carried on
across State lines. The difficulty of the Chicago police in finding the
actual perpetrators of this crime has been almost absolute, just as
perhaps our difficulties in finding the perpetrators of some of our
own crimes, if they have been imported from across State lines or
across international boundaries, are also almost absolute.lu
116. See 1968 Narcotics Hearings, supra note 34, at pt. 3, at 773 (Anthony Biase
biography).
117. See N.Y. Times. March 25, 1967, at 8, col. 3; 1963 Narcotics Hearings, supra note
34, at pt. 1, at 159: M. GOSCH & R. HAMMER, supra note 60, at 315-19; G. WOLFE & J. DiMONA,
FRANK COSTELLO, PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNDERWORLD 258 (Bantam Book ed. 1975).
118. Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 531 (1964); 1963 Narcotics Hearings,
supra note 34, at pt. 2, at Ex. No. 40 facing 509; N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1966, at 39, col. 4.
For the early antecedents of interstate burglary operations see F. TANNENBAUM, supra
note 34, at 99-100 (quoting from a 1915 report of the Chicago City Council on Crime).
119. J. STARR, supra note 34, at 23, 156.
120. Cook, Cigarette Bootlegging: Who Says "Crime Doesn't Pay"?, ForbeS, Dec. 15,
1977, at 43-48.
121. 1963 Narcotics Hearings, supra note 34, at pt. 2, at 487. See V. TEaESA, supra note
14, at 179-86; S. BRILL, THE TEAMSTERS 69 (1978).
122. 1968 Narcotics Hearings, supra note 34, at pt. 2, at 480. See also J. STARR, supra
note 34, at 42.
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Finally, the meetings of organized crime gang leaders from widely
separated parts of the United States provides additional proof of the
national scope of organized crime's activities. Such meetings are known
to date back to the Prohibition Era. Thus, in 1928, the police raided a
meeting in Cleveland, Ohio, at which the following persons were pre-
sent: Joseph Profaci and Vincent Mangano of Brooklyn, New York, Ig-
nazio (Red) Italiano of Tampa, Florida, one person accused of murder
in New Jersey and twenty other men."'
Teresa writes about regular meetings of organized crime bosses from
all over the United States during the second World War at the racing
stables owned by Joseph Lombardo, the New England gang chief, in
Framingham, Massachusetts.12" ' In 1957, the notorious Appalachin, New
'York, meeting was attended by at least 58 persons: 33 from New York,
8 from New Jersey, 6 from Pennsylvania, 2 from California, 2 from Ohio,
and 1 each from Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Texas, and
Cuba. Joseph Profaci, Vito Genovese, Anthony Maggadino, Mike Miran-
da, John Scalish, Joe Magliocco, Santos Trafficante, and other gang
leaders attended.125 Other meetings of gang leaders from all over the
United States appear to have occurred in Queens, New York, on
September 22, 196626 and somewhere in the New York City area in
1976.121
The significance of the interstate and international scope of La Cosa
Nostra operations on the ability of law enforcement agencies to secure
:information about criminal activities is great. When a murder is com-
mitted by out of state killers who enter the state only to commit the
murder and leave, the difficulty of apprehending the murderers is
"almost absolute." They are unknown to the local police, residents of
the community, and even to the victim. The "almost absolute" immuni-
ty enjoyed by interstate murderers is indicated by the fact that of 976
organized crime murders in the Chicago area from 1919 to October, 1963,
"usually committed by hired killers often imported from other cities for
this specific purpose .... only two have been solved by the arrest and
conviction of the killers. "'
123. E. REmD, supra note 26, at 32-33. For a detailed account of meetings in 1929 in Atlan-
tic City: New Jersey, and in 1946 in Havana, Cuba, see M. GOSCH & R. HAMMER, supra
note 60, at 103-07, 311-19.
124. V. TERESA, supra note 14, at 24-25.
125. FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN THE
LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD, S. REP. No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 487-505 (1960); D.
FRASCA, KING OF CRIME 177-90 (1959).
126. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1966, at 1, col. 8. See the testimony of Carlos Marcello in
Organized Crime in Sports, Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Crime, 92d Cong..
2d Sess. pt. 2, at 962-69, 1966-97 (1972).
127. N.Y. Times, March 21, 1976, at 1, col. 2.
128. See 1968 Narcotics Hearings, supra note 34, at pt. 2, at 487.
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When plans are made in one state for criminal activities in other
states or even in different jurisdictions of the same state, when orga-
nized crime bosses live in communities other than those in which the
criminal operations that they administer are carried out,'" interest in
and opportunities for police surveillance of La Cosa Nostra leaders' ac-
tivities are greatly reduced.
Clearly then, the interstate and international scope of organized
crime activities curtails the amount of information about these activities
that is available to law enforcement agencies.
VI. THE ESSENTIALITY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
Without the ability to use electronic surveillance, law enforcement
agencies would be virtually powerless to protect individual freedom
against invasions by organized crime. As has been shown, murder and
intimidation effectively limit the availability of information from gang
members and associates, customers, victims and witnesses.", Conse-
quently, law enforcement agencies must rely on their own personnel for
information and evidence about organized crime's activities.
Of the methods available to law enforcement personnel for securing
information, only electronic surveillance is effective against higher
echelon organized crime leaders. Infiltration and physical surveillance
do not work: infiltration, because organized crime's methods for recruit-
ment and screening of members and insulation of leaders make it almost
impossible for a law enforcement agent to penetrate its upper levels.
Ralph Salerno, an expert on organized crime, said that "any allusion to,
or illusion of, the penetration of organized crime constitutes an exercise
in semantics." ' While an agent may succeed in becoming a hanger-on
or minor workerin organized crime activities, the recruitment and
screening of members, including the requirement that a potential
member commit murder for the gang, " makes it virtually impossible
to place an undercover agent inside a gang.'TM As an outsider, the agent
129. See 1963. Narcotics Hearings, supra note 34, at pt. 1. at 251,254. For a list of about
100 reputed La Cosa Nostra members from various regions in the United States and their
connections with South Florida, see Organized Criminal Activities, Hearings Before the
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 764, 765 (1978).
130. See text at notes 81-103, supra.
131. N.Y. Times, March 8, 1967, at 30, col. 4.
132. See text at note 90, supra.
133. See E. G6DFREY, JR. & D. HARRIS, BASIC ELEMENTS OF INTELLIGENCE 21 (Law En-
forcement Assistance Administration, Department of Justice, 1971). A recent federal in-
dictment of two reputed gang members refers to infiltration of the gang by two under-
cover F.B.I. agents. N.Y. Times, March 30, 1982, at 18 col. 1 (National Ed.).
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would not be permitted any contact with higher level bosses.'"
Physical surveillance is inadequate because it does not disclose the
purpose of meetings or the substance of conversations at meetings or
by telephone. If there is no informant, only electronic surveillance can
provide this essential information to law enforcement agencies.,' And,
even if an informant will provide information, usually he will not testify.'"
Electronic surveillance does not suffer from these deficiencies. By
using the technique of "working up the ladder" (i.e., successive wiretaps
of higher echelon criminals with each wiretap based on probable cause
secured from wiretaps on lower echelon criminals) information about the
criminal involvement of gang leaders can be secured. Traditional inves-
tigative work, including the use of informers, provides the indispens-
able basis for the initial wiretaps on the gang members or associates. 3,
The resulting court authorized electronic surveillance yields not only
information, but also indisputable, and almost always undisputed,
evidence of guilt.1 Electronic surveillance contributed to the elimina-
tion of a majoi gambling organization which had been corrupting law
enforcement officers in Massachusetts for many years. It produced
evidence of gambling, extortion, narcotics, customs, and stolen securities
violations in New York; and it produced evidence of narcotics violations
in Washington, D.C. by two gang leaders who had successfully resisted
many previous efforts to prove their guilt by the use of other methods.'-
In a few cases, bugs provided evidence when wiretaps would have
been ineffectual."" The bugs can be installed at the headquarters of an
organized crime leader and can furnish information about planned gang
operations which may not be available by wiretapping."'
134. NATIONAL WIRETAP COMMISSION LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS CONFERENCE
17 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NWC EFFECTIVENESS CONF.J
135. See E. GODFREY. JR. & D. HARRIS, supra note 133, at 19. See also United States v.
Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 531 (1974) (in which the affidavit supporting an application for
a wiretap stated "conventional surveillance would be completely ineffective except as an
adjunct to electronic interception").
136. NWC EFFECTIVENESS CONF.. supra note 134, at 15; testimony of FBI Director
Clarence M. Kelley, 1 NWC HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 96.
137. See NWC REPORT, supra note 15, at 49-51.
138. Id. at 132-33.
139. See id at 4-5, 49-51. See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1980, at 1. col. 3; id., Nov. 20,
1979, S A, at 1, col. 1.
140. Of 1,220 federal electronic surveillance orders from 1968 to 1973. only 26 provid-
ed solely for bugging. NWC REPORT, supra note 15, at 43. An additional 38 allowed both
bugging and wiretapping to be used. From 1974 to 1979, 152 federal intercepts allowed
bugging alone or in combination with wiretapping. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, REPORTS ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEP-
TION OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNICATI6NS for the years 1969 to 1979.
141. See NWC REPORT, supra note 15, at 15. Between 1961 and 1965, the headquarters
of Samuel Rizzo De Cavalcante and Angelo (Gyp) De Carlo were bugged. See N.Y. Times,
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Consistently and almost unanimously law enforcement personnel
have testified that electronic surveillance is indispensable to the effort
to repress organized crime. From 1900 to 1950, law enforcement records
and statements indicate that wiretapping "produced remarkable results
in the prevention of crime and the apprehending of major criminals....-4 2
In 1962, New York County District Attorney Frank S. Hogan
testified that electronic surveillance is
the single most valuable weapon in law enforcement's fight against
organized crime .... It has permitted us to undertake major inves-
tigations of organized crime. Without it, and I confine myself to top
figures in the underworld, my own office could not have convicted
Charles "Lucky" Luciano, Jimmy Hines, Louis "Lepke" Buchalter,
Jacob "Gurrah" Shapiro, Joseph "Socks" Lanza, George Scalise,
Frank Erickson, John "Dio" Dioguardi, and Frank Carbo. ... 14
In 1967, President Johnson's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice reported that
the great majority of law enforcement officials believe that the
evidence necessary to bring criminal sanctions to bear consistently
on the higher echelons of organized crime will not be obtained with-
out the aid of electronic surveillance techniques. They maintain these
techniques are indispensable to develop adequate strategic intelli-
gence concerning organized crime, to set up specific investigations,
to develop witnesses, to corroborate their testimony, and to serve
as substitutes for them-each a necessary step in the evidence-
gathering process in organized crime investigations and
prosecutions.""
In 1976, the National Wiretap Commission reported the conviction
of most law enforcement officers that electronic surveillance is "abso-
June 11, 1969, at 1, col. 6. In 1972. a New York area organized crime headquarters was
bugged. See id., Oct. 17, 1972, at 1, col. 8. In 1976, bugging was used to secure evidence
about James J. Napoli Sr.'s 35 million dollar gambling operation. Id., Aug. 25, 1976, at
1. col. 1, In 1980, Carlos Marcello, reputedly a national La Cosa Nostra boss, was indicted.
Evidence in the case against him was obtained by means of wiretaps and bugs placed
in his office. See Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, June 19, 1980, at 1, col. 1; id., July 5,
1980, S B, at 4, col. 4; N.Y. Times, June 18, 1980, at 1, col. 1. For an insight into the value
of information secured by means of electronic surveillance of members of the Kansas City,
Missouri, Mafia gang see U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Sept. 29, 1980, at 49-51.
142. DASH, SCHWARTZ AND KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS 34 (Rutgers Univ. Press
1959).
143. See Testimony in Support of the Attorney General's Program, Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 172-73 (1962).
144. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A-FREE SOCIETY, 201. Accord, FIRST REPORT OF THE
CALIFORNIA ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL COMMISSION, p. 25 (1978).
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lutely essential to thorough and effective law enforcement," because
without the power to conduct electronic surveillance
[ijn addition to making cases only against street-level operations, law
enforcement would know less generally about organized crime.
Fewer lower-echelon personnel would be induced to "turn," that is,
to become witnesses or informants for the government .... [and]
[miost importantly . . .convictions against the highest-ranking
members of tightly organized criminal conspiracies would not be
possible."'
The views of law enforcement officers were expressed to the Na-
tional Wiretap Commission by the New Jersey Attorney General's of-
fice. It informed that Commission that it had been more successful in
combating organized crime since it had obtained authority to use
wiretaps and stated that "there can be no meaningful organized crime
investigations without wiretapping .... " It stated that
wiretapping has allowed the development of cases which were not
possible before wiretapping was authorized. This is most important
in gambling cases where prior to 1969 it was almost impossible to
arrest anybody beyond the first level in a bookmaking or lottery
operation. Wiretapping has also been effective in narcotics investiga-
tions. Before wiretapping they might have seized the narcotics, but
seldom could they arrest more than a carrier. Now they can get to
* the higher ups.
And the New Jersey Attorney General's office concluded that no inves-
tigation methods were effective as substitutes for electronic
surveillance.""6
After careful studies, Congress and several independent bodies
agreed with the law enforcement position that electronic surveillance
is an indispensable weapon against organized crime. When it enacted
Title III, Congress found:
Organized criminals make extensive use of wire and oral communica-
tions in their criminal activities. The interception of such communica-
tions to obtain evidence of the commission of crimes or to prevent
145. See NWC REPORT, supra note 15, at 137. Accord, 1976 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 10, at 17, 19.
146. See NATIONAL WIRETAP COMMISSION STAFF STUDIES AND SURVEYS 117 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as STAFF STUDIES AND SURVEYS]. Accord, the statement of New York
Detective Robert Nicholson, who was active in several important investigations of organiz-
ed crime activities, in J. KWITNY, supra note 13, at 403; Clarence M. Kelley, Director, F.B.I.,
Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Aug. 19, 1975, S A, at 14, col. 2; E. GODFREY, JR. & D.
HARRIS, supra note 133, at 19-20; NWC EFFECTIVENESS CONF., supra note 134, at 10, 11, 20.
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their commission is an indispensable aid to law enforcement and the
administration of justice.147
This Congressional finding is in accord with the previously stated con-
clusions of several independent study groups. In 1967, after reviewing
the organization and operations of organized crime, President Johnson's
Commission concluded that "[firom a legal standpoint, organized crime
continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering pro-
cess."'4 8 Consequently, a Commission majority, over the opposition of then
Attorney General Ramsey Clark, recommended that Congress enact
legislation "granting carefully circumscribed authority for electronic
surveillance to law enforcement officers to the extent it may be consis-
tent with the decision of the Supreme Court in People v. Berger.... -,
In 1968, the American Bar Association Advisory Committee on the
Police Function found "that the use of electronic surveillance is necessary
in the administration of justice in the area of organized crime." It con-
cluded that there existed "the most compelling showing of need" justi-
fying an exception to the principle "that all private and public use of
electronic surveillance techniques to overhear private communications
be prohibited."' 50
Finally, in 1976, after an exhaustive, Congressionally mandated study
of the first six years of operation of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520), a majority of the fif-
teen member National Wiretap Commission "vigorously reaffirmed the
finding of Congress in 1968 when it enacted Title III, that electronic
surveillance is an indispensable aid to law enforcement in obtaining
evidence of crimes committed by organized criminals.. .".'"I' While bug-
ging is engaged in rarely by law enforcement agencies, the majority of
the Commission also believed that bugs "are indispensable to law en-
forcement in certain situations" and recommended that court orders
authorizing bugging include express authorization to enter upon pre-
mises, if necessary to install the bugs.'52
147. Pub. L. No. 90-351, S 801(c), historical note following 18 U.S.C.A. S 2510 (1976).
148. See 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 200.
149. See 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10. at 203; N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1966, at
1, col. 7.
150. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONICS SURVEILLANCE 96
(1968 tentative draft) (approved 1971).
151. See NWC REPORT, supra note 15, at xiii. Accord, 1976 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 10, at 148-49; GAMBLING IN AMERICA, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW
OF-THE NATIONAL POLICY TOWARD GAMBLING 52 (1976).
152. NWC REPORT, supra note 15, at xvii-xviii. In Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238
(1979), the Supreme Court held that a court order authorizing bugging impliedly authorized
covert entries to install and service the device.
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Experience with the electronic surveillance provisions enacted by
Congress in 1968 has vindicated its proponents' views. Its general effec-
tiveness is shown by the number of arrests and convictions resulting
from court authorized electronic surveillance orders. The 6,996 electronic
intercepts authorized and installed from 1969 to 1979 resulted in a total
of 30,216 arrests and 14,765 convictions, as follows:
153. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS
AUTHORIZING On APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNICATIONS for the
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In the survey by the National Wiretap Commission, 98 percent
(535/537) of all federal wiretaps in gambling cases resulted in an arrest
and 97 percent (117/121) of all wiretaps in narcotics cases resulted in
arrest.'5 ' And although electronic surveillance is not as effective against
crimes such as loan sharking, extortion, hijacking and fencing, which do
not involve as extensive a use of the telephone as do gambling and nar-
cotics, it has been used successfully in a number of cases involving these
crimes."
Nor is the effective use of electronic surveillance limited to federal
law enforcement agencies. In New Jersey, the state attorney general
used 318 wiretaps from 1969 to December 1973, 73 percent in gambling
cases, 12 percent in narcotics cases, and 9 percent in cases involving rob-
bery, larceny, or stolen property. During that period the office secured
a total of 320 indictments against 841 defendants.'
Although the statistics do not reveal how many of the convictions
resulting from the use of electronic surveillance were in organized crime
cases, "only a very small percentage of them... [were] not related to
organized crime."'5 7 Federal authorities use Title III "chiefly in connec-
tion with organized crime investigations... .,"'1 and the New Jersey At-
torney General follows the same policy. 5
Further evidencing its effectiveness is the fact that the convictions
which electronic surveillance was instrumental in securing reach all levels
of the gangs rather than only the lower echelons who physically commit
the criminal acts. Convicted higher echelon gang leaders in the New York
City area include Nicholas Forlano (gambling), Anniello Dellacroce (tax),
Nicholas Ratenni (gambling), Vincent Rizzo (counterfeit, narcotics, ex--
tortion), Carmine Tramunti (narcotics, perjury), James V. Napoli, Sr.
(gambling), Arthur Tortorello (fraud, sale of unregistered securities),
Enrico Tantillo (narcotics), Carmine Paladino (narcotics), Robert San-
torelli (narcotics), Michael Clemente and Tino Fiumara (labor
racketeering),60
154. NWC REPORT, supra note 15, at 256.
155. Id. at 148-50. Bugging is effective in such cases. For example, in Dalia evidence
obtained by bugging supported the "unmistakable inference... that he was an active
participant in the scheme to steal the truckload of fabric." Dalia v. United States, 441
U.S. at. 245.
156. See STAFF STUDIES AND SURVEYS, supra note 146, at 109.
157. Testimony of United States Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Peterson, 1
NWC HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 41.
158. Testimony of United States Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Peterson, id.
at 7, 41.
159. See STAFF STUDIES AND SURVEYS, supra note 146, at 109.
160. See I NWC HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 50-53,56-57; N.Y. Times, Aug. 25,1976, at
1, col. 1. United States v. Clemente, 640 F.2d 1069, 1072 (2d Cir. 1981).
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Higher echelon gang leaders convicted in New Jersey include Samuel
De Cavalcante (gambling), and Joseph Zicarelli (bribery). And in other
localities: Joseph Nicholas Civella (Kansas City, Mo., gambling); Dominic
Brucclieri, Peter Milano and, Samuel 0. Sciortino (Los Angeles, Calif.,
extortion); and Carlos Marcello (New Orleans, La., conspiracy).", In ad-
dition, Joseph Colombo, leader of one of the New York gangs was in-
dicted on gambling, loan sharking and other charges."2
These statistics and the identity of the convicted gang leaders show
that law enforcement electronic surveillance has had a significant im-
pact on organized crime. Indictments and convictions of organized crime
members and associates based on evidence derived from Title III sur-
veillance have eliminated large scale gambling and narcotics operations
and resulted in the removal of corrupt officials from public office. In
Washington, D.C., for example, use of a Title III wiretap in the Lawrence
Jackson case disclosed the extensive nature of his operations and the
identity of his suppliers, Genovese gang members Carmine Palodino,
Enrico Tantillo and Robert Santorelli. Fifty-five persons were indicted
as a result of the investigation, and Jackson, Palodino, Tantillo, Santorelli,
and Carl Brooks, a Washington, D.C. police narcotics squad officer, were
among those convicted. The Title III intercept helped shut down one
of Washington's largest narcotics operations.'"
In New Jersey, a Title III bug placed in the office of Joseph Zicarelli,
a New Jersey gang leader, resulted in breaking organized crime's con-
trol of a large county. The bug resulted in Zicarelli's indictment for con-
spiracy to murder. This indictment induced one of Zicarelli's con-
federates, Peter Policastro, to become an active informer. Policastro,
following Zicarelli's orders while Zicarelli was imprisoned, delivered pro-
tection payments to various public officials while wearing a concealed
recording device. The information gathered resulted in the indictment
of Zicarelli, his chief lieutenant, other gang members, and several pro-
minent Hudson County, New Jersey, political figures and police officials.
Zicarelli was convicted and sentenced to a long prison term. His organiza-
tion, which was involved in gambling, narcotics, loan sharking, and other
illegal enterprises under the protection of corrupt public officials, was
effectively destroyed.'"
When criminal enterprises have not been eliminated, electronic
surveillance has severely disrupted organized crime activities. Because
161. See I NWC HEARINGS, sup'-a 15, at 50-51; 1975 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
REPORT 93; N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1981, at A13, col. 1.
162. See 1 NWC HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 50.
163. See id. at 56-57. See also the testimony of FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley on
the elimination of Anthony M. Grosso's major numbers gambling business in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, id. at 93-94.
164. See STAFF STUDIES AND SURVEYS, supra note 146, at 112-13, 170.
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of the need to take precautions against electronic surveillance, gambl-
ing activities have been made more expensive. Some organized crime
associates involved in gambling have decided to drop out because the
income no longer justified the risk. Communication among gang members
and associates has been made more difficult. As a result the efficiency
of gang operations and the income derived therefrom have suffered. In
some places, persons have been unwilling to accept leadership positions
in organized crime gangs because of their higher exposure to law en-
forcement action.'"
Clearly, these results refute the assertion by some critics that Title
III has been ineffective against organized crime.'" But a more sophisti-
cated criticism of Title III is based on the fact that it is used mainly in
gambling cases and is therefore of trivial significance.181
This criticism is also invalid. First, although it is true that Title III
is used most often in gambling cases, it is also used in narcotics,
racketeering, homicide, kidnapping and extortion cases. The figures for
1978 are: 42 percent (241) gambling, 34 percent (195) narcotics, 4 percent
(25) homicide and assault, 8 percent (45) racketeering, and 2 percent (14)
loansharking and extortion, 3 percent (15) bribery, 2 percent (13) stolen
property crimes, and 1 percent (5) kidnapping."' Even if all gambling
intercepts are discounted, saving even one life and preventing the ad-
diction of several thousand persons justify the availability of law enforce-
ment use of Title III intercepts.
But the gambling intercepts should not be discounted. They are a
vital element in the fight against organized crime. First, they help to
reduce the enormous income that organized crime gangs receive from
gambling. This income finances other criminal operations, and pays ad-
ministrative expenses for corruption of public officials, payment of a
regular salary to murder specialists,1" and support of jailed members'
families. Second, gambling investigations sometimes provide leads to
other criminal activities by gang members. Thus Operation Fraulein,
which began as a gambling investigation, led to loan sharking, narcotics,
counterfeiting and stolen securities investigations that resulted in the
165. See NWC HEARINGS, supta note 15. at 140-41.
166. See the testimony of Ramsey Clark, 2 NWC HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 1025-26;
testimony of Herman Schwartz, id., at 1088-89.
167. See the testimony of Herman Schwartz, NWC HEARINGS at 1088-89. Compare the
prediction that it was "unlikely" that even "a few more criminals may be convicted in
other cities" than New York. Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The
Politics of Law and Order, 67 MICH. L. REV. 455, 505 (1969).
168. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 153, reports for Jan. 1, to
Dec. 31, 1978, at 8.
169. See V. TERESA, supra note 14, at 180-84.
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conviction of 27 defendants, including 15 organized crime figures.", Third,
gambling investigations provide information about the membership,
structure, and activities of organized crime gangs, which enables tradi-
tional investigative methods to be used against otherwise unknown gang
members and activities. Fourth, gambling and gambling related convic.
tions remove organized crime gang members from the community and
thereby reduce their and their associates' ability to engage in other
crimes.
Thus, the effectiveness of Title III in gambling cases is further
evidence of its overall utility in the fight against organized crime gangs.
VII. OBJECTIONS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT USE
OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
Critics of the law enforcement use of electronic surveillance base
their criticism on two fundamental grounds. First, they question the
value of electronic surveillance as a law enforcement technique in the
fight against organized crime. Second, they condemn electronic surveil-
lance for its interference with individual privacy. The four dissenters
from the National Wiretap Commission Report expressed this criticism
when, in advocating repeal of Title III, they said: "In our view, no substan-
tial impediments would be placed in the way of effective law enforce-
ment, and privacy concerns would be greatly strengthened, by the repeal
of Title III .. .
The criticism that electronic surveillance is not an effective tech-
nique against organized crime was stated most broadly by former At-
torney General Ramsey Clark. Mr. Clark implied that electronic
surveillance was unnecessary because "[p]olice know where numbers are
sold, they know who's running the dice game, they know the prostitutes
and bookies -they do not need a bug to tell them. They know the big
shots, too. Most have criminal records. Their activities are knowable and
known without wiretapping." '
Even if we accept Mr. Clark's views that the street activities of
organized crime and many of its leaders are known to the police, that
does not eliminate the need for electronic surveillance. Many organized
crime activities are not as public as gambling and prostitution. Extor-
tion, hijacking, securities fraud, and corruption of political and law en-
forcement figures, for example, cannot be discovered by observing street
170. See NWC REPORT, supra note 15, at 148.
171. Id. at 180. The four dissenters from the report of the fifteen member commission
were Senator James Abourezk. Congressmen Robert W. Kastenmeier and John F. Seiber-
ling, and Professor Alan F. Westin. Their minority report appears at pages 177-182 of
the National Wiretap Commission Report.
172. R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 289 (New York 1970).
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activities of organized crime personnel. Moreover, even when criminal
activities are ascertainable through police observation of street activities,
that knowledge cannot be translated into evidence against the orga-
nized crime leaders who employ the bookies, narcotics dealers, porno-
graphers and prostitutes. As one law enforcement person working in
a jurisdiction which did not provide for electronic surveillance stated,
"When the federal people get a bookmaking wiretap going they get a
whole organization because of their knowledge obtained over the phones.
They attack an organization. When we attack a bookmaker we attack
an individual."'73 Thus, more than knowledge of criminal activity is re-
quired for effective action against organized crime. Evidence and leads
to evidence that can be used to secure convictions of gang leaders and
members is also needed. Electronic surveillance provides the evidence
and leads.
More frequently, critics of electronic surveillance do not argue that
it is unnecessary. They merely question its effectiveness. Professor Her-
man Schwartz stated in 1974: "The picture is thus quite clear: wiretap-
ping is of no significant value in crime detection or crime preven-
tion ... ." 1 And the National Wiretap Commission dissenters stated,
"Overall, however, we would say that the actual impact of court-ordered
electronic surveillance on Organized Crime in this country has been
minimal."'75
This writer has shown that these statements are invalid, and that
electronic surveillance is indeed effective against organized crime.76 But
it will be instructive to examine the basis on which these critics claim
that electronic surveillance has been ineffective. Such an examination
will show that the claim of ineffectiveness is supported by flimsy and
unconvincing evidence. In his testimony in June, 1975, Professor
Schwartz repeated a charge made in his 1974 report. He said,
It may also be worth noting that the large majority of installations -
many of which are quite costly -have apparently produced nothing.
The federal figures for 1971 and 1972, for example, where we have
relatively complete figures, show that almost two-thirds of the in-
stallations produce nothing:
173. See NWC EFFECTIVENESS CONF., supra note 134, at 11.
174. See Schwartz, Reflections, on Six Years of Legitimated Electronic Surveillance, in
PRIVACY IN A FREE SOCIETY, ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE 52, (spon-
sored by Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation) (1974), reprinted in 2 NWC
HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 1146. Compare Professor Schwartz's testimony on June 11,1975,
stating that his position was "essentially not that wiretapping is ineffective.... Indeed,
I don't really know." See 2 NWC HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 1088.
175. See NWC REPORT, supra note 15, at 179. See also R. CLARK, supra note 172, at 288.




INSTALLATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH FEDERAL CONVICTIONS
Year Gambling Drugs Other Total
1971 ..................... 86/248 6/21 8/12 100/281
1972 ..................... 51/147 15/35 5/23 71/205
Total 137/395 21/56 13/35 171/486"
Professor Schwartz's statement is incorrect. First, his Table 9 shows
only that up to the time he testified "almost two-thirds" of the installa-
tions produced no convictions. But some of these installations produced
arrests which required probable cause and which were followed by con-
victions. Thus, it is inaccurate to say that "almost two-thirds ... pro-
duce nothing."
Even more significant is the fact that when the results for the calen-
dar years through 1979 are taken into account the 1971 and 1972 installa-
tions are shown to have been quite productive. The following table shows
the results of the intercepts installed by federal authorities in 1971 and
1972:
Federal Wiretap Installations
in 1971 and 1972 Resulting in
Convictions and Arrests
Number of
Total Installations that Number of Installations
Number of resulted in that resulted in arrests
Year Installations convictions but no convictions
1971 281 126 49
1972 205 95 23
Total 486 221 72
Thus, rather than two-thirds producing nothing, as of the end of 1979,
45.4 percent of the 1971 and 1972 federal installations resulted in con-
victions, and an additional 14.8 percent resulted in arrests but no
convictions."' The results for 1971 and 1972 are not isolated. Fifty-one
177. 2 NWC REPORT, supra note 15, at 1130. See also Schwartz, supra note 174, at 48.
178. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 153, for the calendar
years 1971 to 1979 (for Supplementary Reports for the years 1972 and 1973, see Table




percent of the 1973 federal installations resulted in convictions and an
additional 19 percent in arrests but no convictions as of the end of 1979.1
The National Wiretap Commission dissenters offered different
evidence for their conclusion that electronic surveillance is ineffective
against organized crime. Based on information on federal indictments
and convictions of "leading" organized crime figures from 1968 to 1974
supplied to Commissioner Blakey by the Department of Justice, they
concluded that "in seven years, Title III has been responsible, directly
or indirectly for only nine federal convictions and three pending indict-
ments against leading Organized Crime figures. The actual impact of
these cases on an organization with over 5,000 known members nation-
wide must be regarded as minimal at best."1 80 I
The dissenters' conclusion was erroneous because it relied on too
small a base when it looked only to convictions and indictments of
"leading Organized Crime figures." The word "leading" is ambiguous and
resulted in understating the impact of Title III installations on organized
crime. Apparently, in its reply, the Department of Justice gave a nar-
row interpretation to "leading" and omitted action against high level
organized crime figures because it did not consider them "leading." For
example, the convictions of Authur Tortorello, a member of the Gam-
bino gang, and of Joseph E. Cafero and Dominick Vinciguerra, associates
of the Bruno gang, are not listed in the "leading" figures list, even though
their criminal activities were substantial and Title. III intercepts were
instrumental in their convictions.'81
Title III's effectiveness against organized crime is more accurately
shown by the overall impact of law enforcement action, including elec-
tronic surveillance, on organized crime, the total number of convictions
resulting from Title III intercepts, and the number of convictions per
intercept. In a 1979 report, Assistant Attorney General Philip B. Heyman
stated
That as a result of initiatives taken within the last two years, we
have begun to make a substantial impact on certain of organized
crime's most insidious activities .... In the prosecutions discussed
below, 134 persons were convicted of serious offenses .... The suc-
cess of these investigations resulted in large part from imaginative
(and often potentially dangerous) undercover operations; lawful,
carefully controlled electronic surveillance; deep informant penetra-
179. Id.
180. NWC REPORT, supra note 15, at 179. The dissenting Commissioners erred in refer-
ring to "seven years," since the information supplied covered only six years. There were
no Title III federal intercepts in 1968. And the names cited by John C. Kenney in his June
5. 1975 reply to Commissioner Blakey cover 1974 actions only. Hence, only six years were
covered in the reply, 1969-1974. See id. at 46-74.
181. See NWC HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 51-53.
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tion and meticulous presentation of documentary and testimonial evi-
dence before grand juries.8'
And a 1977 report stated the Department of Justice's belief that
quantitative statistics indicate that extensive accomplishments have
been made in the Government's continuing campaign against the hood-
lum element. Among these statistics are the FBI's accomplishments
of ... over 6,000 organized crime convictions during the past five
years, including top La Cosa Nostra functionaries in New York City,
New England, New Jersey, Philadelphia, Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit,
Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, Denver, and Los Angeles ... .3
That much of the effectiveness of the efforts against organized
crime is due to Title III intercepts is shown by the number of convic-
tions resulting from such intercepts. The total number of convictions
is relevant because almost all federal Title III intercepts are related
to organized crime.'" Thus, as the following'table shows, through
December 31, 1980, 608 productive Federal intercepts constituting 42
percent of all installed, resulted in a total of 4,781 convictions of per-
sons, almost all of whom were associated with organized crime.'
Productive Federal Title III Intercepts
and Number of Convictions Resulting Therefrom
Total number
of intercepts Number resulting Total number
Year installed in convictions of convictions
1969 30 16 173
1970 180 79 525
1971 281 126 1,060
1972 205 95 881
1973 130 68 494
1974 120 64 574
1975 106 42 395
1976 136 55 339
1977 77 24 132
1978 81 16 72
1979 87 23 136
Totals 1,433 608 4,781
182. See report to Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti, p. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 19,
1979, S A, at 14, col. 3.
183. See letter of Jan. 14,1977 from Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Attorney General
for Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, to Victor L. Lowe, Director, General
Government Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, reprinted in U.S. COMPTROLLER
GENERAL, REPORT TO CONGRESS, WAR ON ORGANIZED CRIME FALTERING 50 (1977).
184. See the testimony of US Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen, 1 NWC
REPORT, supra note 15, at 41.
185. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 178.
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This is a far cry from the "only nine federal convictions and three
pending indictments" mentioned by the National Wiretap Commission
dissenters and is of an order of magnitude that has an impact on orga-
nized crime. Moreover, these figures refer only to federal action against
organized crime figures.'Title III also empowers the states to engage
in electronic surveillance and some states, notably New Jersey, have
used this authority effectively against organized crime members and
associates.'"
Another basis for criticism of electronic surveillance is that it is too
expensive.' Professor Schwartz cumulated the annual cost for electronic
surveillance from 1968 to 1974 showing a total of $9,585,264 in federal
costs and $12,873,394 in state costs. However, he did not compare the
cost of electronic surveillance with the cost of any other law enforce-
ment technique, nor did he indicate what proportion of the total cost
of law enforcement is represented by electronic surveillance."'
Professor Schwartz states that some "interceptions are very expen-
sive," apparently referring to installations whose costs exceeded $15,000.
Again, he does not compare the costs of other law enforcement tech-
niques. And, he estimates the cost per federal conviction involving elec-
tronic surveillance at $3,688.1"
Evaluating the performance and cost effectiveness of different law
enforcement techniques poses great difficulties.' It may well be that
electronic surveillance is the law enforcement technique whose cost ef-
fectiveness is most subject to measurement because Title III mandates
that the costs and results of all intercepts be reported.' In the absence
of similar data on the cost of and results derived from other law enforce-
ment techniques, for example, searches and physical surveillance, it is
impossible to compare their cost effectiveness with that of electronic
surveillance."9 But when the costs of electronic surveillance are compared
186. See STAFF STUDIES AND SURVEY, supra note 146, at 108-15, 170-72.
187. This criticism is inconsistent with condemnation of Title III electronic surveillance
as a lazy man's law enforcement technique that may become habitual and inhibit "the
development of methods of investigation that are effective and efficient ..." R. CLARK,
supra note 172, at 294. There is no indication that electronic surveillance is replacing other
techniques of investigation. In fact, the use of electronic surveillance by both federal and
state authorities since 1972 has diminished.
188. See 2 NWC HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 1129.
189. See id. at 1129-30.
190. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW EN-
FORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1976), Performance
Measurement and the Criminal Justice System: Four Conceptual Approaches.
191. 18 U.S.C. J 2519(29b)(iv) (1976).
192. Studies of the effectiveness of helicopter patrols to reduce residential burglary
point out that "no apprehensions were made ...." Kirschner, The Applicability of a
Helicopter Patrol Procedure to Diverse Areas: A Cost-Benefit Evaluation, 13 J. APPLIED
BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 143, 146 (1980).
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with total cost for police protection it does not appear that electronic
surveillance is an unduly expensive law enforcement technique. For ex-
ample, the total cost of federal intercepts installed in 1974 was
$1,281,126.'" This represents less than two-tenths of one percent (0.0019)
of the $677,000,000 federal outlay for enforcement of federal criminal
law in fiscal 1974.'" Furthermore, Professor Schwartz's figure of $3,668
per conviction compares favorably with a cost of $18,686 per conviction
which is secured by dividing the $677,000,000 1974 federal outlay by
36,230, the number of persons convicted of federal crimes in fiscal 1974.'"
But the principal basis for criticism of law enforcement electronic
surveillance is not lack of effectiveness or cost, but that it invades indi-
vidual privacy. One critic referred to Title III electronic surveillance as
a "massive attack on individual privacy... ," and the four National
Wiretap Commission dissenters stated that "electronic surveillance casts
a wide net" and that it "has a substantial and adverse impact on indivi-
dual privacy within our society."1"
The critics believe that under Title III too many telephones are
tapped, and too many innocent persons and innocent conversations are
overheard. Thus, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark charged that
electronic surveillance is indiscriminate and unfocused.
No technique of law enforcement casts a wider net than electronic
surveillance. Blind, it catches everything in the sea of sound but can-
not discriminate between fish and fowl. It is ineffective and ineffi-
cient because this world is too big to detect crime by gathering all
the noise and silence of whole areas to sift for evidence.97
The National Wiretap Commission dissenters imply the same criticism
when they measure Title III electronic surveillance against the impos-
sible ideal "that only the criminal conversations sought would be inter-
cepted," and state that "Ials a practical matter, however, it does not work
that way. . . ."1' It does not work that way because it cannot work that
way. The impossibility of the ideal is clear from the fact that no law en-
forcement technique attains or can even hope to attain it. Innocent per-
sons are arrested, searches fail to produce evidence, and innocent per-
sons are even convicted.'"
In any event, the criticism of Title III electronic surveillance as an
193. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, SUpra note 153, report for 1974,
Table 5, at XII.
194. See 1977 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Table No. 298, at 179.
195. See id. Table No. 298 at 179, and Table No. 309 at 185.
196. Schwartz, supra note 174, at 1139; NWC REPORT, supra note 15, at 179-80.
197. R. CLARK, supra note 172,. at 290.
198. NWC REPORT, supra note 15, at 179.
199. See generally J. FRANK & B. FRANK, NOT GUILTY (Garden City, N.Y. 1957); E. BOR-
CHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (New Haven, Conn. 1932).
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indiscriminate "big ear" is far off the mark. Title III contains safeguards
that were designed to assure that "the order will link up specific per-
son, specific offense, and specific place .... [The provisions of Title III]
are intended to meet the test of the Constitution that electronic
surveillance techniques be used only under the most precise and discrim-
inate circumstances, which fully comply with the requirement of
particularity."'
Title III establishes the following safeguards against indiscriminate
use of electronic surveillance. It requires:
-a showing of probable cause that a crime has been, is being,
or is about to be committed;
-a description of the locations where the communication is to
be intercepted;
- that the type of communication to be intercepted be particu-
larly described;
- that the identity, if known, of the persons whose communica-
tions are to be intercepted be disclosed;
- that it be shown that alternative investigative procedures have
been tried and failed or that they "reasonably appear to be unlikely
to succeed if tried or would be too dangerous";
- that the period of time for which the interception is required
to be maintained, which in no event may be longer than thirty (30)
days without extensions, be stated;
-and that facts about any previous applications for orders to
engage in electronic surveillance of the same persons, facilities, or
places be disclosed."'
Moreover, under 18 U.S.C. S 2516, electronic surveillance may only be
used against persons engaged in serious crimes or persons engaged in
crimes in which there is a high degree of organized crime involvement.
These safeguards are enforced by a statutory rule excluding any evidence
obtained in violation of the provisions of Title III, as well as by criminal
and civil penalties. 2
The effectiveness of these safeguards is evidenced by the National
Wiretap Commission's conclusion "that the procedural requirements of
Title III have effectively minimized the invasion of individual privacy
in electronic surveillance investigations by the law enforcement officers.
When properly implemented, Title III procedures have served to pro-
200. S. REP. No. 1097.90th Cong.. 2d Sess. 102 (1968).
201. See 18 U.S.C. S 2518(3)(a), (1)(bXii), (1)(b)(iii), (1)(biv), (1)(c), (1)(e) (1976).
202. See id. SS 2518(10), 2515, 2511(1). 2520 (1976).
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tect the privacy not only of innocent individuals but also of the persons
who are the subject of the investigation." "
The statutory safeguards against indiscriminate use of electronic
surveillance are supplemented by institutional ones. In the federal
system, an elaborate internal review procedure must be successfully com-
pleted before an application for a Title III order may be submitted to
a court. All federal applications go through two separate multistage
review proceedings. One is in the FBI or other agency involved in the
investigation. The other is in the Department of Justice and consists of
six stages, beginning with the United States Attorney or Federal Strike
Force handling the investigation and ending in the Attorney General's
office.'
Another institutional safeguard against the indiscriminate use of
electronic surveillance is the care with which many judges review ap-
plications for intercept authorizations.2" The National Wiretap Commis-
sion concluded that generally federal judges carefully review applica-
tions for authorizations to engage in electronic surveillance and that state
judges differ in the degree of care with which they review such applica-
tions.' When the courts found that the procedural requirements of Title
III were not complied with, they did not hesitate to suppress any
evidence obtained as a result of the electronic surveillance. In 1974, for
example, evidence obtained in 60 cases involving 626 defendants was sup-
pressed because the applications for the orders were authorized by the
Attorney General's Executive Assistant rather than the Attorney Gen-
eral or a specifically designated Assistant Attorney General."
7
Finally, the ultimate safeguard against abuse of electronic
surveillance is the fact that the public officials who use this law enforce-
ment technique are responsible to the people. Congress intentionally
centralized in a publicly responsible official subject to the political
process the formulation of law enforcement policy on the use of elec-
tronic surveillance techniques. Centralization will avoid the possibil-
ity that divergent practices might develop. Should abuses occur, the
lines of responsibility lead to an identifiable person. This provision
in itself should go a long way toward guaranteeing that no abuses
will happen."'
203. See NWC REPORT, supra note 15, at xvi.
204. See id. at 55-56. In fiscal 1979, the United States Department of Justice internal
review process was "considerably streamlined," but it remains in effect. See 1979 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 57.
205. See NWC REPORT, supra note 15, at 74-76.
206. Id.
207. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974): United States v. Chavez, 416
U.S. 562, 599 (1974).
208. See S. REP. No.1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1968).
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Despite these safeguards, critics contend that electronic surveillance
under Title III is a "massive attack on individual privacy ...... To prove
this, Professor Schwartz, sets out to show "how much ... electronic
surveillance costs us in ... a loss of privacy," by cumulating the number
of installations for the years 1968 to 1974, the number of people
overheard, and the number of conversations intercepted. He concludes
that from 1968 to 1974 there were a total of 4,184 installations; 200,143
people were overheard; and 2,721,337 conversations were intercepted. 1
The technique of cumulating the figures for several years results
in a misleading indicator of the extent of the invasion of privacy due to
electronic surveillance. Obviously, if the cumulation is continued for
enough years, it could show that a substantial proportion of the adult
population was overheard and that every conversation made in the
United States during a particular time was overheard. This is misleading
because only a miniscule proportion of the population, and an even
smaller proportion of the telephones in use and telephone conversations
made each year, are overheard as a result of Title III surveillance.
Requisite to accurate depiction of the extent of invasion of privacy
due to law enforcement electronic surveillance is the proportion of in-
stallations, persons overheard and conversations intercepted in any given
year to the relevant total figures for that year. When that is done, the
figures show that the invasion of privacy resulting from Title III inter-
cepts is insignificant.
Professor Schwartz's table shows that 1972 was the year with the
largest number of installations, persons overheard, and conversations
intercepted. In that year there were 839 installations, 42,182 persons
were overheard, and 517,205 conversations were intercepted. Since there
were 132,000,000 phones in use in the United States in 1972, about six
phones out of every million (0.0000063) were subject to a Title III in-
tercept for an average period of 18.5 days during the year.", And the
42,182 persons overheard in some conversations in 1972 represent about
3 out of every 10,000 persons (0.000228) in the then total noninstitutional
population 16 years and over numbering 145,800,000.1" As for the 517,205
conversations intercepted in 1972, they are but an infinitesimal portion
of the more than J99 billion telephone calls made in that year. Only 2.5
conversations out of every million made in 1972 (0.0000025) were the sub-
ject of a Title III intercept.213 Since the number of installations, persons
209. Schwartz, supra note 174, at 1139.
210. See 2 NWC HEARINGS, supra note 15, Table 1, at 1128.
211. See 1975 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES Table No. 851, at 515; AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS. supra note 153, Table No. 7. The latter table gives
the total number of days that 841 installed intercepts were in operation in 1972 as 15,561,
resulting in an average length of 18.5 days.
212. See 1977 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES Table No. 625, at 387.
213. The 1975 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES Table No. 851, at 515, in-
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overheard, and conversations intercepted pursuant to Title III were
lower in 1978 and 1979 than they were in 1972, at the same time that
the United States population, number of telephones installed, and
average number of telephone calls made each day increased, the ratio
of Title III installations to telephone in use, and the ratio of persons
overheard and conversations intercepted under Title III to persons us-
ing the phones and total number of telephone conversations has become
even smaller. "'0
Thus the figures evidence not "a massive attack on individual
privacy" but rather an economical use of Title III as a law enforcement
technique. That the few targets of Title III intercepts can be carefully
chosen to discriminate between intercepts that serve legitimate law en-
forcement purposes from those that needlessly invade individual privacy
is shown by the number of productive federal intercepts and their results.
Arrests and Convictions
Resulting from Federal
Intercepts from 1969 to 1979215
Number of Number Arrests Convictions Arrests Convictions
Year Intercepts Resulting Through Through per per
Installed in Arrests 12/31/79 12/3179 Installation Installation
and/or
Convictions
1969 30 19 300 173 10 5.8
1970 180 114 1,081 525 6 2.9
1971 281 175 2,172 1,060 7.7 3.8
1972 205 118 1,261 881 6.2 4.3
1973 130 90 877 494 6.7 3.8
1974 120 85 705 574 5.9 4.8
1975 106 53 523 395 4.9 3.7
1976 136 65 508 339 3.7 2.5
1977 77 38 369 132 4.8 1.7
1978 81 26 117 72 1.4 0.9
1979 87 28 194 136 2.2 1.6
forms that in 1972 the number of average daily conversations in the United States was
546,000.000. Multiplying by 365 yields a total of 199,290,000,000 conversations in 1972.
The NWC REPORT understates the lack of justification for "[tihe average citizen's fears that
he might be the victim of electronic surveillance" when it says that "over two billion
telephone calls were placed in the United States in 1974 .... See NWC REPORT, supra
note' 15, at xviii. The correct figure is more than 223 billion calls. See 1975 STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES Table No. 851, at 515, which indicates that the average
number of calls made each day in the United States during 1974 was 613 million.
214. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, upra note 153, reports for 1978
and 1979, Table Nos. 9 and 4; 1979 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES Table
No. 644, at 392, Table No. 973, at 582.
215. ADMINISTRATIVE OFncrE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 153. reports for 1969 to
1980.
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These statistics show that Title III intercepts can be and are targeted
on criminal activities and not on personal matters. They prove that the
statutory and institutional safeguards have been effective in focusing
the use of Title III intercepts on securing evidence of criminal conduct.
More than half of Title III intercepts installed by federal authorities pro-
duced sufficient grounds for at least an arrest. As the table after foot-
note 185 shows, 41 percent produced sufficient grounds for conviction.
And those that result in arrests and convictions lead to the'apprehen-
sion of participants in conspiratorial type crimes, characteristic of
organized crime, as evidenced by the number of arrests and convictions
per installation.
Further evidence that law enforcement officials are careful to focus
Title III intercepts on criminal activity is the small number of such in-
tercepts that are suppressed. For example, in 1979, only one motion to
suppress a 1979 federal intercept was granted while 27 were denied and
three were pending."t' And of 281 motions made in 1979 to suppress prior
year intercepts, 212 were denied, 61 were pending, and only 8, all in-
volving state intercepts, were granted.2 7
One basis for the contention that electronic surveillance unduly in-
vades individual privacy are figures that show that "many innocent, non-
criminal conversations are intercepted on every wiretap .. 8 The Na-
tional Wiretap Commission dissenters stated,
The extent to which this occurs differs with the type of crime being
investigated. The Commission examined 1,309 gambling wiretaps and
found 107 in which not a single incriminating conversation was in-
tercepted. On the average, all gambling wiretaps yielded about 63
percent incriminating and 37 percent nonincriminating conversations.
For narcotics offenses, where criminal conversations are fewer and
farther between, only 25 percent of the monitored interceptions were
deemed incriminating; 75 percent were innocent in nature. For theft-
related crimes, that figure rises to. 84 percent, meaning that only
16 percent of intercepted conversations were related to any sort of
criminality.
These figures are disturbing in that they suggest that even under
a court-ordered system, electronic surveillance has a substantial and
adverse impact on individual privacy within our society. Wholly in-
nocent persons are overheard and great numbers of nonincriminating
conversations are monitored by government agents.2 "
216. See id.. report for 1979, Table No. A-I.
217. See id. Table No. 8.
218. See NWC REPORT, supra note 15, at 179.
219. Id. at 180.
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This criticism is invalid because the percentage of incriminating con-
versations is not significant in determining the-value of law enforcement
electronic surveillance to protection of persons from criminal conduct.
All law enforcement techniques involve police exposure to innocent as
well as incriminating materials. For example, when a search warrant
is executed, officers see a lot of innocent material that is not covered
by the warrant while searching for the material specified in the war-
rant. The fact that they do does not make search warrants an undue in-
terference with privacy. Similarly, the fact that in an electronic intercept
involving murder or kidnapping, only one of the conversations was in-
criminating does not make the reasonable overhearing of other conver-
sations an undue interference with individual privacy. The intercepts
were all necessary in order to intercept the one dealing with the murder
or kidnapping.'
As the Supreme Court pointed out in Scott v. United States, even
though "the percentage of nonpertinent calls is relatively high" their
interception may still be reasonable."' The nonpertinent calls may have
been intercepted in an early stage of the surveillance, before it was clear
that they were in a non-pertinent category. They may have been short
conversations whose relevance to the investigation could not be deter-
mined before the conversation ended. They may have been unique or
ambiguous. Moreover, the type of criminal conduct being investigated
may require listening in on many calls which later prove to be innocent.
"For example, when the investigation is focusing on what is thought to
be a widespread conspiracy more extensive surveillance may be justified
in an attempt to determine the precise scope of the enterprise."2" The
applicability of this last factor to organized crime wiretaps is obvious.
If electronic surveillance were used without securing any incrimi-
nating conversations that fact would evidence undue interference with
privacy, because it would show that intercepts were being used without
any valid law enforcement reason. But, as we have seen, that is not the
case. Forty-one percent of all federal intercepts in the 1969 to 1979 period
resulted in convictions. In fact, in 1969, 1973 and 1974 more than 50 per-
cent of the federal intercepts resulted in convictions, and it is too early
to predict what the final results of the 1977 to 1979 intercepts will be.U
It is therefore clear that Title III surveillance is being used for law en-
forcement purposes, and that the number of innocent conversations
overheard are unavoidable side effects to the achievement of valid law
enforcement objectives.
220. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978). See also Dalia v. United States,
441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979).
221. See 436 U.S. at 140.
222. Id. at 140.
223. See text at notes 178 and 179, supra.
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Electronic surveillance is also criticised because it may be misused
by law enforcement officials. Ramsey Clark indicated that the police may
use electronic surveillance for corrupt purposes, for example, to -deter-
mine how much of a payoff should be made to them, or for personal
reasons because they dislike someone's political or social beliefs.22' Of
course, these abuses, though unlikely because of the safeguards surround-
ing issuance of Title III orders, are possible. However, as of 1976, the
National Wiretap Commission was able to report "[w]e know of no in-
stance, furthermore, in which a judicial electronic surveillance authoriza-
tion was obtained in bad faith." '225
There has been some illegal police wiretapping without court orders
in New York, Texas, and Pennsylvania. The Commission found illegal
wiretapping in those states, and stated that such illegal police actions
"are not to be condoned. Unauthorized wiretapping is a plain violation
of the criminal provisions of Title III, and should be dealt with accord-
ingly ..... , In at least One such case, in Houston, Texas, six police of-
ficers were convicted for illegal interceptions of communications in
1976.1 That law enforcement authorities are careful about avoiding
misuse of electronic surveillance is indicated by the fact that five F.B.I.
agents were placed on administrative leave pending the outcome of a
federal grand jury investigation into alleged improper conduct on their
part. The alleged improper conduct was that the agents returned an il-
legal bugging device to the Richmond police, one of whose members had
placed an illegal wiretap, instead of confiscating it for the Department
of Justice in accordance with regulations."
The ultimate criticism of electronic surveillance is that, even under
court order, it has a chilling effect on free speech.' Ramsey Clark states
this criticism in terms of the need to maintain a free society:
Pervasive surveillance of the individual, his every word and deed,
is possible through the wonders science will bestow on us in the next
few years. The wonders are adequate now to create widespread belief
among many people that their phones are tapped, or their rooms
bugged. This hardly has a stabilizing influence on society. It does
not create confidence in government or the purposes of our laws.'
The evidence proves that these alarms are baseless. The extent of
electronic surveillance in American society under Title III is insignifi-
224. See R. CLARK, supra note 172, at 292-93.
225. NWC REPORT, supra note 15, at 17, 19.
226. Id. at 20.
227. See 1976 U.S. Attorney General's Annual Report 64.
228. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1975, at 11, col. 1.
229. See the testimony of H. Schwartz, in 2 NWC HEARINGS. supra note 15, at 1096-98.
230. R. CLARK, supra note 172, at 297.
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cant in terms of number of telephones tapped, persons overheard, or con-
versations overheard. When it occurs, it is justified by valid law enforce-
ment needs as shown by the high percentage of federal intercepts that
result in either conviction or arrest.
Nor is there any evidence of a chilling effect on free speech. That
the public does not fear any such effect is indicated by its support for
court ordered electronic surveillance."l Furthermore, the widespread
and vocal opposition to the Viet Nam War and to the abuses of presiden-
tial power revealed by the Watergate investigations occurred while Title
III was in effect, proving that Title III did not limit Americans' exercise
of the right of free speech.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In Katz v. United States,m the Supreme Court held that governmen-
tal electronic surveillance of a telephone conversation by a non-
participant is a "search and seizure" subject to the fourth amendment.
In its opinion, the Court implicitly outlined the requirements for a con-
stitutional statute providing for court ordered electronic surveillance. M
Congress tried to observe these requirements when it enacted Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Thus,
Senator McClellan, its chief sponsor, stated during the debate on Title III,
Let us be candid about this. If there are any flaws in this proposal,
we want to find them. We do not want anything unconstitutional.
We tried to pattern this legislation after what the Supreme Court
said in the Berger and Katz decisions. I think we have, but if in any
particular we have not, we want to find it as much as anybody else.24
It appears that Congress was successful. The Courts of Appeal have
upheld Title III's constitutionality,' and the Supreme Court has implicit-
ly approved Title III's constitutionality in several decisions interpreting
its provisions.' However, no constitutional issue is finally resolved, until
231. See 1976 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, Table 2.49, at 324 and Table
2.50.
232. 389 U.S. 347,353 (1967). The Court has held that electronic surveillance by a par-
ticipant to a conversation and the discovery of telephone numbers called by means of a
pen register, are not "searches" because callers "can claim no legitimate expectation of
privacy" in information voluntarily conveyed. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,743-44 (1979).
233. See 389 U.S. at 354-56.
234. See 114 CONG. REC. S 6111 (daily ed. May 22, 1968). quoted by Professor G. Robert
Blakey in his concurrence to the NWC REPORT, supra note 15, at 189.
235. See, e.g., United States v. Frederickson, 581 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 158-59 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Lewis v. United States,
423 U.S. 996 (1975).
236. See, e.g., Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979) (covert entry to install
a Title III authorized bug is constitutional); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978)
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it is correctly resolved. 7 Moreover, even if it is constitutional, the ad-
visability of Title III must still be determined.
The evidence is overwhelming that there exists in this country a
criminal organization of national scope. This organized crime group was
and is capable of depriving people of their rights to life, liberty, and prop-
erty by its criminal acts. It has used and continues to use its power for
that purpose.'
The methods that organized crime uses to increase its members' and
associates' income and to frustrate their apprehension and punishment
are murder, assault, extortion, intimidation, and corruption of law en-
forcement and other government officials. These methods have enabled
a similar, probably allied, criminal organization to secure a dominant role
in Sicilian economic and political life, resulting in terrorization of the
populace by and subservience of the governmental system to the crimi-
nals." 9 In the United States these methods have enabled La Cosa Nostra
to secure a dominant position in some sectors of American economic and
political life -control of some powerful labor unions, control of signifi-
cant economic activities, and corruption of law enforcement and other
governmental officials. While organized crime does not dominate
American society, its impact is evident not only in the communities,
unions, and enterprises that it controls, but also throughout the com-
munity in geographic areas where it is active. Thus, the right to engage
in some businesses in the New York City area depends on permission
(objectively reasonable interception of all telephone calls in executing a Title III wiretap
satisfied both constitutional and statutory minimization requirements). See also United
States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 426-27, 429 n.19, 437 n.25 (1977) (unintentional failure
to identify known persons in a Title III application whose conversations the applicant
believes will relate to criminal activity does not require suppression of evidence against
them secured by means of the electronic surveillance); Bynum v. United States, 423 U.S.
952,952-53 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). A view expressed soon
after the adoption of Title III that is was of "dubious constitutionality" has thus proven
to be incorrect. See Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics
of Law and Order, 67 MICH. L. REV. 455, 456 (1969).
237. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
238. The Supreme Court recognized the "pervasiveness of the problem" created by
the existence and activities of organized crime, in its decision holding the RICO (Racketeer
Influenced Corrupt Organizations) provisions, 18 U.S.C. sections 1961 to 1968, applicable
to illegitimate as well as legitimate enterprise. See United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct.
2524 (1981).
239. See N. LEWIS, THE HONORED SOCIETY (N.Y. 1964); G. SERVADIO, MAFIOSO: A HISTORY
OF THE MAFIA FROM ITS ORIGINS TO THE PRESENT DAY (Delta ed. N.Y. 1978); N.Y. Times, March
4, 1979, at 4, col. 1; id., Aug. 14, 1980, S A, at 8, col. 5. Nor is Mafia power confined to
Sicily. In the 1970's, by using violence (including 165 murders of businessmen), intimida-
tion, and corruption, the Mafia in Calabria secured control of 30 percent to 40 percent
of the business activity in that part of Italy. Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
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from an organized crime gang.' In some areas, citizens are afraid to
testify or even provide information about criminal acts which they
witnessed." In view of its past effectiveness, one cannot dismiss the
possibility that organized crime may gain a dominant role in American
life similar to that of the Mafia in Sicily.
242
The gravity of organized crime's threat to individual freedom and
a democratic society in which government is responsible to the people
rather than the gang boss," requires the use of effective law enforce-
ment tools that are consistent with the Constitution. The evidence is
overwhelming that court ordered electronic surveillance is one such
highly effective law enforcement tool. Its constitutionality is determined
by accomodating the basic values of protecting individuals and United
States society from the threat posed by criminal conduct, and "the poten-
tial danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy and
free expression . ".2. ."I
The threat of organized crime to individual freedom and American
society has been shown. Neither the Constitution nor wise policy require
that court ordered electronic surveillance, an effective instrument
against organized crime, be discarded on the basis of unfounded charges
of undue governmental invasion of individual privacy and potential
240. J. KWITNY, supra note 13, at 104-05. 125-37,235-36: N.Y. Times. June 29, 1977, S B,
at 4, col. 3; id., June 3, 1977, at 1, col. 4; id., June 25, 1978, at 26, col. 6; id., Nov. 17, 1966,
at 38, col. 3; id., Jan. 4, 1969, at 18, col. 1; id., March 28, 1968, at 33, col. 1; id., March 24.
1967, at 63, col. 4; id., Nov. 29, 1969, at 17. col. 6. See the column by Dan Dorfman, Baton
Rouge Morning Advocate, Jan. 24, 1980. S C, at 14, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1982, SY,
at 32, col. 1.
241. See N.Y. Times, June 9, 1980, S B, at 6, col. 1. See text at notes 100-03, supra.
242. In 1980, the Chairman of the Pennsylvania Crime Commission labeled organized
crime "the most insidious and all-pervasive evil in our free society" and described it as
"a cruel and seditious force which seeks to subvert and nullify our social, economic and
political institutions." PENNSYLVANIA CRIME COMMISSION, A DECADE OF ORGANIZED
CRIME- 1980 REPORT at vi (1980). In 1969, a respected observer, Donald R. Cressey, ad-
vocated "a little cold-blooded appeasement . . ." as "especially valuable when 'our side'
is losing, as it is losing to Cosa Nostra .... D. CRESSY, THEFT OF THE NATION- THE STRUC-
TURE AND OPERATIONS OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA 323 (New York, 1969).
243. See D. Cressey, supra note 242, at 252-53.
244. 407 U.S. at 314-15. In United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 151 (1974), the Court
said, "To be sure, Congress was concerned with protecting individual privacy when it
enacted this statute. But it is also clear that Congress intended to authorize electronic
surveillance as a weapon against the operations of organized crime. There is, of course,
some tension between these two stated congressional objectives .... " The objectives
of the Canadian legislation on electronic surveillance, which is substantially modeled after
Title III, are similar: "to enhance the protection of privacy in Canada" and "to invest law
enforcement personnel with the sophisticated investigative aid provided by electronic
surveillance in order to ensure the adequate protection of the citizenry whose privacy
was so zealously guarded . D. " . WATT, LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN CANADA
2 (Toronto, 1979).
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danger to free expression. As has been shown, the extent of governmen-
tal interference with individual privacy resulting from Title III electronic
surveillance is negligible.'"
The threat posed by La Cosa Nostra to personal freedom and a
democratic society is real, present and grave. The risks involved in court
ordered law enforcement electronic surveillance are negligible. Given
these circumstances, we would be foolish to "expose our property and
our liberty to the mercy [of ruthless criminals] and invite them by our
weakness to seize the naked and defenceless prey, because we are afraid
that rulers, created by our choice, dependent on our will, might endanger
that liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to its preservation."2"6
Accomodating the competing policies leads to the conclusion that judicial-
ly supervised electronic surveillance is both constitutional and advisable.
245. See text at notes 211-215, supra.
246. THE FEDERALIST No. 25 (A. Hamilton).
